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Literature that covers the topic of U.S.-Russian space cooperation tends to isolate it 
from the overall context of U.S.-Russian relations, while literature that does take the 
rivalrous relationship into account tends to focus primarily on non-cooperative outer 
space ventures. This thesis seeks to explain why cooperation between the U.S. and 
Russia emerged and why it has continued in spite of often negative relations on Earth. 
To examine this case study, I first explore the history of American and Russian/Soviet 
space activities, highlighting critical points of cooperation emergence, continuation, and 
discontinuation. After assessing the usefulness of major theories of international 
relations in assisting with this research question, I then examine the critical historical 
junctures primarily through the lenses of neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism 
(especially epistemic community literature) in order to determine the causes of 
cooperation’s emergence and maintenance. I find that the scientific community’s 
support for the norm of scientific cooperation in outer space, formal institutions 
codifying this norm, and entrenchment of this norm in the government system due to 
socialization, habit-formation, geopolitical interests, and perceptions of status were the 
main contributors to the emergence and maintenance of space cooperation between 
Russia and the U.S. This finding has great importance for the future of U.S.-Russian 
space cooperation, as they suggest its strength and likelihood of continuation. It also has 
great implications for the possibility of space cooperation with other emerging space 
powers and the private sector. This finding suggests these cases may have more 
difficulties in reaching a relationship that mirrors that of the U.S. and Russia in the 
realm of space cooperation.
1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The United States and Russia have been closely cooperating in the realm of 
outer space for decades. Even amidst conflicts on earth, which have at times reached a 
level some have deemed “proxy war,” outer space cooperation has continued.1 In fact, 
large-scale cooperation through the International Space Station (ISS) and RD-180 
rockets has so entrenched itself in the U.S. and Russian space systems that to end 
cooperation would cause a huge monetary loss, a decrease in scientific output, and 
require the redesigning of spacecraft.2  Even at points in recent history during which 
tensions were higher than before, as during the early 1980s, cooperation in outer space 
still continued between Russia (at that point, the Soviet Union) and the United States.3 
This interesting observation suggests an important research question: what are the 
causes of the emergence and maintenance of U.S.-Russian space cooperation, which 
appear to be strong enough to overcome tense political relations over earthly matters?  
 Existing literature on the topic does not provide a clear answer to this question. 
Some literature discussing U.S.-Russian space cooperation does so in a vacuum devoid 
of the context of U.S.-Russian relations overall, arguing it can serve as a positive model 
                                                 
1 The New York Times, Russia Today, and CNN labelled the Syrian conflict a proxy war between the 
U.S. and Russia. Mark Mazzetti, Anne Barnard, and Eric Schmitt, “Military Success in Syria Gives Putin 
Upper Hand in U.S. Proxy War,” The New York Times, August 6, 2016, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/07/world/middleeast/military-syria-putin-us-proxy-war.html?_r=0.; 
“Russia & US will engage in ‘global war’, unless ‘proxy’ Syria conflict resolved – Turkey’s deputy PM,” 
Russia Today, October 12, 2016, https://www.rt.com/news/362572-us-russia-syria-proxy-war/.; “Syria’s 
‘proxy war’ rages in towns near Aleppo, Syria,” CNN, October 14, 2015, 
http://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2015/10/14/anderson-syria-proxy-war-aleppo-syria.cnn. 
2 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Strategic 
Forces, Hearing on Assuring National Security Space: Investing in American Industry to End Reliance on 
Russian Rocket Engines, 114th Cong., 1st sess, 2015, 36-37. 
3 Roald Sagdeev, “United States-Soviet Space Cooperation during the Cold War,” NASA, May 28, 2008, 
https://www.nasa.gov/50th/50th_magazine/coldWarCoOp.html. 
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for multi-national cooperative ventures in general.4 Others who recognize the negative 
tensions between the U.S. and Russia focus primarily on outer space activities that have 
mirrored this relationship, particularly focusing in the era of the space race.5 This thesis 
seeks to bridge the gap and reconcile the reality of a friendly, scientific outer space 
relationship with the reality of often negative U.S.-Russian relations in general by 
determining the reasons for space cooperation’s emergence and maintenance.  
 Chapter two provides the historic background of U.S. and Russian space 
activities. It is organized loosely by decade and goes through the evolution of space 
activities chronologically, noting periods of cooperation and competition throughout. 
This history chapter provides details about important events in cooperation, such as the 
creation of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the Apollo-Soyuz 
Mission, low-level cooperation throughout the 1980s, the fall of the Soviet Union, and 
the creation of the International Space Station. It also details competitive moments in 
space history and events leading up to cooperation points, in order to provide complete 
historic context. This historical background provides the building blocks from which the 
later analysis uncovers the answer to the research question. 
 Chapter three provides an overview of relevant theories of international relations 
and their stances on cooperation – the likelihood of its emergence, the likelihood of its 
maintenance, the tools that actors consciously use to affect cooperation, and the 
                                                 
4 See: Lara L. Manzione, “Multinational Investment in the Space Station: An Outer Space Model for 
International Cooperation?” American University International Law Review 18, 2 (2002).; David Tan, 
“Towards a New Regime for the Protection of Outer Space as the ‘Province of All Mankind,” Yale 
Journal of International Law 25 (2000). 
5 See: Alice Gorman and Beth O’Leary, “An ideological vacuum: The Cold War in outer space,” in 
Fearsome Heritage: diverse legacies of the Cold War, ed. John Schofield and Wayne Cocroft (New 
York: Left Coast Press, 2007), 73.; Richard A. Morgan, “Military Use of Commercial Communication 
Satellites: A New Look at the Outer Space Treaty and ‘Peaceful Purposes,’” Journal of Air Law and 
Commerce 60 (1994). 
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mechanisms that operate on a more subconscious level in supporting cooperation. It 
points out persuasive and unconvincing elements of the frameworks and weighs the 
effectiveness of each framework of thought in helping to examine transitions of 
cooperation and methods of cooperation in outer space. This chapter provides the 
theoretical tools with which to unpack the evidence outlined in chapter two. 
 Chapter four analyzes the research question using seven critical turning points in 
history to organize discussion and the primary theoretical frameworks of neoliberal 
institutionalism and constructivism. It highlights the importance of perceptions of status 
and geopolitical threats, formal institutions, and norms of scientific cooperation and 
respect for international institutions in bringing about and upholding cooperation. This 
chapter answers the research question, finding that the scientific community and the 
norms of scientific cooperation that it supported for use in outer space activities and the 
creation of formal institutions that support the peaceful, scientific uses of outer space 
were the primary creators of space cooperation. It also finds that the increased 
entrenchment of these norms of space cooperation within the upper-level government 
due to continued support from the scientific community and the process of socialization, 
habit-formation, geopolitical interests, and perceptions of status, in addition to the 
previously stated two factors, contributed to the maintenance of space cooperation. 
 Chapter five concludes the thesis by identifying the implications these findings 
have for the future of space cooperation between the U.S. and Russia, the possibility of 
space cooperation between the U.S. or Russia and emerging space partners (in particular 
China), and the private sector in outer space. It highlights the extraordinary nature of 
space cooperation between the U.S. and Russia and explains some of the difficulties 
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other rivalrous states and non-state actors may encounter when trying to replicate this 
relationship in the contemporary age. 
Chapter 2: Historic Overview of U.S.-Russian Relations and Outer 
Space Projects 
This chapter provides the historic background of Russian and American 
activities in space, which will facilitate analysis in later chapters of U.S.-Russian space 
cooperation. The chapter has been broken into five parts – the 1950s & 1960s, the 
1970s, the 1980s, the 1990s, and the 2000s to present – loosely following decade 
demarcations as well as general shifts in space relations from competition to 
cooperation and vice versa and follows chronological order whenever possible for 
clarity. This chapter does not in itself seek to answer the greater research question of 
why the sides cooperated, and instead lays the groundwork for when and how they 
cooperated (or did not) in order to track overall trends in cooperation for later analysis. 
Overall, the relationship with regard to outer space has shifted back-and-forth between 
more competitive and more cooperative at various points through history, but has 
evolved into a state of relatively robust cooperation.  
The Space Race of the 1950s & 1960s: An Era of Competition 
The space race traced its roots to the Soviet-American race to acquire German 
rocket technology and scientists during World War II. The Nazi V2 rocket that Wernher 
von Braun and his team developed paved the way for Cold War missiles. The 
International Geophysical Year (IGY) from 1957 through 1958, which supported 
collaborative scientific projects between 67 countries, set a goal of putting a satellite 
5 
into orbit.6 The IGY grew as a brainchild of a group of American scientists who 
modelled the IGY on the International Polar Years of 1882 and 1932 that had 
encouraged scientists from many different countries to study the Polar Regions. In 
September 1954, Lloyd Berkner, head of Brookhaven National Laboratory, Vice 
President of the Comité special de l’année géophysique international (CSAGI), and 
President of the International Scientific Union, arranged two committees to study the 
utility of scientific space programs, and included members of the Soviet Academy of 
Sciences. Although the Soviet scientists remained silent at the meetings, the committees 
ultimately approved the American scientists’ proposal of orbiting a satellite for 
scientific purposes.7 This set the stage for space operations to be of a scientific, rather 
than military/defense-related nature. But the end of the 1950s instead saw a shift toward 
competition, rather than the IGY’s hoped-for scientific collaboration, and paved the 
way for a militaristic space in which reconnaissance satellites, rather than scientific 
projects, took precedence. 
In March 1954, RAND Corporation, in the “Feedback” study cosponsored by 
the CIA, had suggested that the Air Force undertake “at the earliest possible date 
completion and use of an efficient satellite reconnaissance vehicle as a matter of vital 
strategic interest to the United States.”8 By March 1955, the Air Force issued General 
Operational Requirement Number 80, asking for private sector proposals for developing 
a photographic reconnaissance satellite.9 Lockheed won the proposal in October 1956 to 
                                                 
6 Gorman and O’Leary, “An ideological vacuum,” 73. 
7 Edward Clinton Ezell and Linda Neuman Ezell, The Partnership: A History of the Apollo-Soyuz Test 
Project (Washington, D.C.: NASA, 1978), kindle loc. 500, 507. 
8 William E. Burrows, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security (New York: Random House, 
1986), 83. 
9 Ibid., 84. 
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develop Weapons System 117L, code named Pied Piper.10 The overall five-year-long 
project that included two reconnaissance systems and a surveillance system constituted 
the US’s first space program.11 
In February 1955, the USSR chose a region at the Tyuratam junction on the 
Moscow-Tashkent railway, 200 km from the town of Baikonur, in the Kazakh Soviet 
Socialist Republic for the R-7 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) testing facility.12 
The top-secret area went nameless for fear of American intelligence, but is today most 
commonly known as Baikonur.13 Given that this is the modern-day location of the 
Baikonur Cosmodrome, I will use that name in discussing this area, except when 
referencing material that explicitly uses the name Tyuratam.  
On October 4, 1957, the USSR launched an R-7 ICBM carrying Sputnik 1, the 
first artificial satellite, into space.14 On November 3, 1957, the USSR launched Sputnik 
2, carrying Laika, a dog who became the first animal to orbit the Earth.15 The U.S. had 
been focused on the scientific IGY mission of the Vanguard satellite, but switched 
support to the military satellite Explorer out of a fear of the military threat that the 
USSR posed based on its launch of Sputnik I.16 The propaganda potential for the Soviet 
Union was enormous and Nelson Rockefeller, President Eisenhower’s special assistant 
stated, “I am impressed by the costly consequences of allowing the Russian initiative to 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ben Evans, Escaping the Bonds of Earth: The Fifties and Sixties (New York: Springer Praxis Books, 
2009), 4-5. 
13 Baikonur refers more generally to a wider area near the town of the same name. Alternate names for 
this strategically important area included “Gagarin’s Start,” after the most historic event that occurred 
there, and Tyuratam, after the railway junction that is actually closest to the site. Evans, Escaping the 
Bonds of Earth, 4. 
14 Ibid., 5. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Gorman and O’Leary, “An ideological vacuum,” 73. 
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outrun ours through an achievement that will symbolize scientific and technological 
advancement to people everywhere. The stake of prestige that is involved makes this a 
race we cannot afford to lose.”17 Sputnik was an embarrassment to the Eisenhower 
administration, which was accused of being overly frugal and naïve about Soviet 
intentions.18  
This event signaled the completely competitive nature of the US-USSR space 
relationship amidst a cloud of fear over military abilities in space.19 According to the 
US National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) Working Group on A 
National Integrated Missile and Space Vehicle Development Program in 1958, the 
primary goal was “to catch up with and ultimately surpass the Soviets in the race for 
leadership on this planet and for scientific and military supremacy in space.”20 The 
conflicting desires of the U.S. government to establish dominance in technology against 
the USSR and of American scientists to work cooperatively in studying the cosmos 
clashed in the discussions in which the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration was born out of the NACA; its civilian leadership showed Eisenhower’s 
desire to avoid an militarization of outer space and his support for space exploration 
“for peaceful purposes only.”21 Meanwhile Lockheed’s Pied Piper was publicly 
cancelled after an article about it leaked in Aviation Week, which set the US up for 
                                                 
17 Ezell and Ezell, The Partnership, kindle loc. 543. 
18 Illustrating the public’s level of disapproval, Michigan Governor G. Mennen Williams penned this 
poem: “Oh Little Sputnik, flying high/With Made in Moscow beep,/You tell the world it’s a Commie 
sky/And Uncle Sam’s asleep/You say on fairway and on rough/The Kremlin knows it all,/We hope our 
golfer knows enough/To get us on the ball.” Burrows, Deep Black, 93-94. 
19 Ezell and Ezell, The Partnership, kindle loc. 568. 
20 Ibid., 580. 
21 Ibid., 591. 
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Khrushchev’s criticism of the U.S.’s blatantly militaristic, rather than scientific, uses of 
space.22 
 By 1959 NASA had gained a mandate to cooperate in international programs, 
but without any clear guidance regarding with whom and to what extent they should 
cooperate.23 Meanwhile, through letters between the American and Soviet leadership 
and in debates at the United Nations (UN), American leaders towed the Eisenhower line 
and spoke/wrote of the need to ban militarization of outer space, while the USSR 
thought these calls were a trap that sought to strip Russia of its security against 
America’s nuclear strike capabilities so that America, with the support from its allies in 
the UN, could become the dominant power in space and on Earth.24 Khrushchev 
claimed to seek détente with the West, but also exploited every American misstep to 
bolster Soviet propaganda.25 The USSR’s failures were kept in greater secrecy, to take 
away that propaganda weapon from the U.S.26  
Eisenhower supported cooperating with the USSR in all areas of space except 
for the US reconnaissance program.27 Although not explicitly relating to outer space 
use, Eisenhower’s “Open Skies” proposal that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. exchange locations 
of military installations allowing for aerial surveillance to provide verification for arms 
accords (which the Soviets rejected) in some ways seems to suggest his openness in the 
realm of reconnaissance. But it is important to note that Eisenhower himself said later 
that he knew the Soviets would reject it and he hoped to gain a propaganda victory 
                                                 
22 Burrows, Deep Black, 107. 
23 Ezell and Ezell, The Partnership, kindle loc. 641-648. 
24 Ibid., 677-684. 
25 Ibid., 703. 
26 Charles S. Sheldon (II), Review of the Soviet Space Program: With Comparative United States Data 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), 12. 
27 Burrows, Deep Black, 141. 
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through the proposal by making the Soviets appear to be disinterested in arms control 
overall.28 In late 1958 U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles suggested the creation 
of a UN space committee and in 1959 the ad hoc United Nations Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was born, which Eisenhower hoped would protect U.S. 
freedom in its space activities, to allow its reconnaissance projects to succeed.29 
On January 21, 1959, the CIA and Air Force’s Discoverer 1, intended to be a 
camera-less test-run of a sophisticated reconnaissance satellite, was aborted on the 
launch-pad. It made it into orbit almost a month later, but lost control due to a fault in 
the stabilizing system. Discoverers 2-12 similarly experienced various failures.30 The 
USSR launched its first lunar probes in 1959; in January, Luna I was the first to 
penetrate interplanetary space, Luna II was the first to hit the moon, and Luna III 
photographed the back side of the moon in October.31 1959 was an unfortunate year of 
launch failures for the U.S., but a rather successful one for the USSR.32 
 In May 1960, Khrushchev, who was dreading an upcoming summit given a 
widening ideological split with China and the hardening opposition to the USSR by the 
U.S., U.K. and France regarding the two Germanys, took an upper hand and gracefully 
avoided the summit while placing blame on the U.S. after American pilot Francis Gary 
Powers was shot down in his Lockheed U-2 high altitude reconnaissance aircraft in the 
Soviet Union, which would be named the infamous “U-2 incident.”33 This harmed 
                                                 
28 Andrew Glass, “Ike offers ‘Open Skies’ plan at Geneva Summit, July 21, 1955,” Politico, August 21, 
2010, http://www.politico.com/story/2010/07/ike-offers-open-skies-plan-at-geneva-summit-july-21-1955-
039988. 
29 Burrows, Deep Black, 141. 
30 Ibid., 109-110. 
31 Ezell and Ezell, The Partnership, kindle loc. 716. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 722-728. 
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NASA’s hopes for cooperation further, as it had served as Powers’s cover for his 
clandestine intelligence flight, which clouded perception of its own motives.34 This 
event, along with the anti-Soviet defense-heavy focus of the Kennedy versus Nixon 
Presidential campaign, quieted calls for international space cooperation among 
American scientists.35 While Eisenhower had downplayed the idea of a military 
competition in space, Nixon, in response to Kennedy’s call for America to not “run 
second in this vital race,” highlighted the U.S.’s successes in the space race, saying, “If 
the Eisenhower Administration had not long ago recognized that we were in a strategic 
race with Russia, our space record would not be as creditable as it is today.”36  
Eisenhower and his NASA tried to keep the conversation on cooperation going 
with the Soviets; Arnold Frutkin, Deputy Director of NASA international programs 
talked with Anatoliy Arkadyevich Blagonravov of the Soviet Academy of Sciences 
about the possibility of using the Echo I communications satellite, which had launched 
August 12, 1960, for experimenting with communication between the US and USSR.37 
Meanwhile on August 10, 1960, the CIA finally got the reconnaissance satellite 
Discoverer 13 to make a successful trip, followed by Discoverers 14-18, which had 
taken good-quality photographs.38 The New York Times and Aviation Week reported on 
the Discoverer program; this reporting was met by a Soviet International Affairs journal 
article that emphasized the illegality of spy satellites flying over Soviet territory and 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 735. 
36 Ibid., 747-753. 
37 Ibid., 758. 
38 Burrows, Deep Black, 110. 
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warned that the Soviets could bring down any satellite just as they had with Powers and 
his U-2.39 
 Between May 1960 and March 1961, the USSR tested the manned spacecraft, 
called the Korabl-Sputnik at that point (which means “Spaceship-Satellite”) by sending 
small mammals, plants, fungi, and a human-sized mannequin called “Ivan Ivanovich” 
into orbit in it.40 Some of these were successful, as with the dogs Belka and Strelka who 
survived and are today displayed in taxidermy-form in the Memorial Museum of 
Cosmonautics in Moscow. Others were not successful, sending the craft further into 
space when trying to return to Earth or simply exploding immediately following lift-
off.41 On October 23, 1960, an R-16 missile exploded on the launch pad, killing 130 
technicians, military officers, and engineers.42 Its destruction of the launch facility 
delayed the planned, manned space launch that would use an R-7.43  
On August 25, 1960, the U.S. government created the National Reconnaissance 
Organization (NRO) to centralize some of the operations fought over by the CIA and 
Air Force.44 On September 22, Eisenhower addressed the UN and suggested a four-
point treaty for the peaceful exploration of outer space based on the 1959 Antarctic 
Treaty, which banned military activity and allowed scientific research on the 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 111. 
40 Evans, Escaping the Bonds of Earth, 6. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., 5. 
43 Ibid., 6. 
44 The Air Force and the CIA both saw themselves as the rightful leader in space reconnaissance, and 
their competition went beyond greed for funding and into the realm of a power-status dispute; the CIA’s 
Corona and Air Force’s SAMOS programs competed directly for funding and for the honor of being 
America’s foremost space reconnaissance system. The Air Force was particularly sour about the thought 
of losing more ground to a civilian agency after NASA’s formation in 1958. Burrows, Deep Black, 202-
203. 
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continent.45 Kennedy’s inaugural address seemed to support the themes of cooperation 
for which Eisenhower laid the groundwork, as Kennedy invited all nations (including 
the USSR)  
to join with us in developing a weather prediction program, in a new 
communications satellite program and in preparation for probing the distant 
planets of Mars and Venus, probes which may someday unlock the deepest 
secrets of the universe… Both nations would help themselves by removing these 
endeavors from the bitter and wasteful competition of the Cold War.46  
 
Kennedy appointed Jerome Wiesner of MIT as his assistant for science and technology, 
an appointment which was quickly followed by the Wiesner Report, prepared by 
Kennedy’s science advisers, which criticized Eisenhower’s space program, but foresaw 
possibilities for cooperation in space exploration.47 Public addresses from Kennedy 
continued to keep the themes of cooperation, while privately Kennedy struggled to 
balance cooperation and competition, worrying that the perception of being second rate 
in space would reflect poorly on America’s military strength.48 
By April 7, 1961, despite some of the unsuccessful attempts with the Korabl-
Sputnik, the Soviets decided to go ahead with the Vostok mission, worried that the U.S. 
would beat them to the manned flight by the end of April.49 On April 9 the Soviets 
announced that Yuri Gagarin would be the first man in space, which was possibly due 
in part to Korolev’s favoring of Gagarin over German Titov as a person or to General 
Nikolai Kamanin’s assessment of Titov’s “stronger character” that would be more 
useful on the Vostok 2, as it would spend an entire day in space.50 On April 12, 1961, 
                                                 
45 Ezell and Ezell, The Partnership, kindle loc. 764. 
46 Ibid., 783. 
47 Ibid., 771-777. 
48 Ibid., 796. 
49 Evans, Escaping the Bonds of Earth, 10. 
50 Ibid., 10-11. 
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Yuri Gagarin became the first man in space as he orbited once in the Vostok, which was 
propelled into space by the R-7, and returned safely to Earth.51 
On April 14, 1961, Kennedy called a meeting with his aides to discuss the 
possibility of landing a man on the moon in order to show American technological skill 
and beat Russia.52 Soviet propaganda using Gagarin’s flight stressed that it showed the 
virtues of “victorious socialism,” the technical superiority of the Soviet Union over all 
other nations, and the ultimate Soviet goal of world peace and disarmament, in spite of 
its ability to turn its technological superiority into production of superior military 
weapons.53  
 Meanwhile on April 17, 1961, the Bay of Pigs operation took place, in which 
1,500 Cuban exiles landed in a pro-Castro area of Cuba, and were met by Castro’s 
troops who, after four days of fighting, killed or captured all of them.54 Kennedy’s 
embarrassment over the fiasco led him to turn toward outer space as the frontier in 
which to beat the Soviets; a memo he wrote to Vice President Lyndon Johnson read, “Is 
there any space program that promises dramatic results in which we could win? Do we 
have a chance of beating the Soviets by putting a laboratory in space or a trip around the 
Moon or by a rocket to land on the Moon or by a rocket to go to the Moon and back 
with a man?”55 Johnson turned to Wernher von Braun, a rocket scientist who had 
designed the Nazi V-2 missile before defecting to the U.S. in 1945, who suggested a 
lunar landing as he felt the current Soviet rocket technology could not get them to the 
                                                 
51 Ibid., 11. 
52 Ibid., 26. 
53 Ezell and Ezell, The Partnership, kindle loc. 808. 
54 Evans, Escaping the Bonds of Earth, 28. 
55 Ibid. 
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moon. Von Braun had joined NASA in 1958 only on the condition that he could work 
on the Saturn rocket, which was in the early planning stages by his discussion with 
Johnson. Von Braun told Johnson they could reach the moon by 1967 or 1968.56  
Three weeks after the Bay of Pigs failure, on May 25, 1961, Kennedy gave his 
famous speech declaring the U.S.’s commitment to “landing a man on the moon and 
returning him safely to earth” before the end of the decade.57 He tied the competition in 
space to the “battle that is going on around the world between freedom and tyranny.”58 
Kennedy’s speech reaffirmed the relationship between the USSR and US as one of a 
competitive rather than cooperative nature and NASA mirrored this position, telling 
Congress that although they still were open to cooperation, the lack of openness with 
which the Soviets carried themselves in international meetings meant there was little 
chance of successful cooperation.59 
On May 5, 1961, Alan Shepard became the first American in space aboard the 
Mercury-Redstone 3 or Freedom 7.60 The Soviets had not completely abandoned the 
possibility of cooperation, but they maintained pride for their technological 
superiority.61 In a press conference, Leonid Sedov, Soviet Chairman of the Commission 
for the Promotion of Interplanetary Flights of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 
congratulated Shepard, while pointing out that Gagarin’s flight was more important and 
promoted the Soviet position that a solution to the disarmament problem was necessary 
before any meaningful international space cooperation could occur.62 
                                                 
56 Ibid., 28-29; 
57 Ezell and Ezell, The Partnership, kindle loc. 844. 
58 Ibid., 832. 
59 Ibid., 844. 
60 Sheldon, Review of the Soviet Space Program, 15. 
61 Ezell and Ezell, The Partnership, kindle loc. 855. 
62 Ibid., 861. 
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Back in the USSR, Khrushchev urged Korolev to move quickly on the Vostok 2 
and suggested that it fly before August 10, 1961 – a date which some later speculated 
was meant to produce a propaganda hype that would cover up the Berlin Wall’s initial 
building.63 On August 6, 1961 German Titov, in Vostok 2, became the second person to 
orbit Earth and the first to orbit multiple times and get space sickness.64 While in orbit 
Titov relayed greetings to the U.S. and was promoted by Khrushchev in a 
congratulatory call.65 On August 13, 1961, a week after Titov’s successful mission, East 
German troops sealed the border in Berlin and began building the Berlin Wall.66 
Korolev continued work, applying the technology from the Vostok to the production of 
the Zenit spy satellite.67 Facing American opposition over the wall, Khrushchev 
threatened to sign a peace treaty with East Germany, which would give it recognition as 
a separate communist state – something the US did not want.68 Kennedy threatened to 
go to war to defend Berlin’s freedom, which Khrushchev took to be an ultimatum.69 
Khrushchev responded by breaking the moratorium on atmospheric nuclear weapons 
tests and starting September 1, the USSR ran tests for two months, the biggest of which 
was the 58-megaton explosion of the most powerful hydrogen bomb at that time.70  
Discussion of rules in outer space had continued to take place in the United 
Nations since the establishment of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. 
In December 20, 1961, the UNGA adopted Resolution 1721, declaring international law 
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applicable to humans and human activities in outer space.71 This established that the 
sphere of influence of the UN would not end at the edge of the atmosphere, but instead 
pertained to human activities, setting a precedent that would later establish the UN’s 
ability to decide law pertaining to human activities far beyond Earth’s orbit.  
On February 20, 1962 American astronaut John Glenn orbited the Earth three 
times and set a record for longest “confirmed-successful” flight aboard the Mercury-
Atlas 6 as the third American in space and the first American to orbit.72 On May 24, 
Scott Carpenter orbited in the Mercury-Atlas 7, aka Aurora 7.73 In the USSR, the triple-
Vostok mission turned into a dual-Vostok mission due to constraints of the Soviet 
tracking and rescue networks and Kamanin limited Korolev’s three day goal for each to 
a two day mission, to reduce his cosmonauts’ chances of sickness.74 Soviet leadership 
demanded the launch be in early March, after seeing the Americans’ successful orbit, 
but a month turnover was far too quick for Kamanin and technical issues and multiple 
Zenit launch failures delayed the mission until July.  
In December 1961, the Soviet delegation ended its boycott of the UN 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, hinting at a future possibility of 
cooperation.75 Frutkin and Hugh Dryden, Deputy Administrator of NASA, visited with 
Blagonravov on March 27, 1962 for an informal discussion about the possibility of 
cooperation between the space programs.76 On May 10, 1962 Vice President Johnson 
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gave a speech to dedicate the NASA Space Exhibit at the Seattle World’s Fair in which 
he said that joint scientific efforts would be beneficial for the political realm, but that it 
would take both sides to shoulder the burden and so he approached the possibility “with 
a spirit of cautious  optimism.”77 
On July 9, 1962, the U.S. detonated a thermonuclear warhead in its Starfish 
Prime test in the Pacific Ocean, which inadvertently disabled satellites and caused 
radiation concerns for manned orbit.78 After asking that the U.S. refrain from nuclear 
tests while the USSR launched more men into orbit, the Soviets sent Andrian Nikolayev 
aboard Vostok 3, powered by an R-7, into space on August 11, 1962.79 Pavel Popovich 
followed suit on August 12 in Vostok 4.80 On October 3, 1962, American Walter 
Schirra orbited in the Sigma 7 on the Mercury-Atlas 8 mission.81  
On October 14, 1962 U.S. U-2 aircraft reconnaissance photos showed ballistic 
missile base construction in Cuba.82 Following the Bay of Pigs failure, Cuba declared 
itself a socialist republic and allied openly with the USSR, which then began to install 
coastal defense missiles and Soviet-controlled nuclear weapons in Cuba.83 The Joint 
Chiefs of Staff supported a full military invasion of Cuba, while Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara supported a naval blockade focused only on weapons, which might 
still technically count as an act of war under international law, but which Kennedy 
thought would not provoke a Soviet counter-strike.84 Kennedy’s decision to create a 
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blockade around Cuba led Khrushchev to counter that this was an act of aggression and 
marked possible transition from Cold to Hot War.85 This escalation in temperament led 
to U.S. forces going to DEFCON 2, signaling imminent warfare and on the morning of 
October 26, in the midst of a stalemate, Kennedy decided, privately with his advisors, 
that it would take a U.S. attack to get the missiles out of Cuba, though he hoped 
diplomacy might still work.86 Khrushchev sent Kennedy a message noting the horrors a 
nuclear war would have in store for the world and proposed that, “If there is no 
intention to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not 
only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that 
knot. We are ready for this.”87 In response, Kennedy sent Khrushchev a message 
indicating he would promise not to invade Cuba in exchange for Soviet missile removal 
under UN supervision.88 After some clandestine negotiation of a quid-pro-quo removal 
of U.S. based missiles from Turkey, on October 28, Khrushchev publicly stated the 
Soviet missiles would be removed and by November 20, 1962 the U.S. quarantine was 
over.89 
By the mid-1960s, both the USSR and the US were using photographic space 
technology; part of the power of deterrence relied on letting the enemy know that the 
weapons exist – thus both sides were somewhat open to allowing reconnaissance 
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missions from the enemy, in private of course.90 Regardless, Kennedy decided early on 
that space reconnaissance should be veiled in secrecy, in contrast to Eisenhower’s 
comparative openness about the subject.91 This secrecy helped to maintain the integrity 
of the intelligence-gathering process; avoided opening the Soviets to ridicule that might 
provoke an angry response; hid the massive reconnaissance budget from the public, 
ensuring its continual funding; protected arms control negotiations, as it was easier to 
verify, privately, that the satellites did their job rather than putting it up to public 
scrutiny; kept less developed countries from feeling paranoid that Kennedy was spying 
on them; and allowed the President to keep all his options open after gaining 
information from reconnaissance missions, rather than having to pay attention to the 
popular opinion on the matter.92  
The Cuban missile crisis solidified the importance of U.S. space reconnaissance 
for the U.S. government; American satellites eventually exposed the Soviet long-range 
ballistic missile program as a fraud, and pictures from the crisis itself helped Kennedy 
to keep Khrushchev at bay.93 It also showed that satellite reconnaissance helped to 
stabilize the Cold War, because it reduced the element of surprise.94 As William 
Burrows writes,  
The gravest concern in the realm of space policy in four successive 
administrations, beginning with Eisenhower’s and ending with Richard M. 
Nixon’s was not getting astronauts safely to the moon and back, however 
important those voyages were taken to be, but protecting U.S. ‘spy’ satellites 
from attack, both politically and militarily. And their safety remains of such 
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paramount importance that… an attack on a U.S. reconnaissance satellite would 
be taken as an act of war.95  
 
The U.S. satellites were not always successful, however; the KH-5 Argon – an Air 
Force reconnaissance satellite program that left out the NRO – attempted its first 
mission in February 1963 and failed.96 Between 1963 and March 30, 1967, forty-six 
KH-5s orbited, and four failed outright (those that did reach orbit suffered failure soon 
after).97 
 On May 15, 1963, Gordon Cooper took off from Cape Canaveral in Faith 7 on 
the Mercury-Atlas 9 – the last Mercury program manned mission and the last time an 
American orbited solo.98 The U.S. space program was gradually moving toward the 
moon. Khrushchev’s goal for the Soviet space program was more focused on short-term 
spectacular stunts that his regime could use for propaganda; the next great Soviet 
mission was sending the first woman into space.99 This decision coincided with the U.S. 
decision to bar interested female pilots from participation in the Mercury space 
program.100 Allowing women into the Soviet program was a way for the USSR to show 
that women were equal to men, which was part of the socialist state’s ideology.101 
Kamanin narrowed 200 female aviation sports candidates to five who he then trained, 
and finally chose Valentina Tereshkova, of whom he said, “She is a Gagarin in a 
skirt.”102 On June 14, 1963, Valeri Bykovsky flew Vostok 5 and was joined in orbit on 
June 16 by Tereshkova on the Vostok 6 for a dual flight mission. The launch coincided 
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with British Labour party leader Harold Wilson’s visit to Moscow, during which he 
asked how many cosmonauts the USSR had in space this time and Khrushchev replied, 
“Only one… so far!”103 Tereshkova totaled 48 orbits of Earth and 70 hours in flight, 
beating the six Mercury missions to that date combined.104 That was the end of the 
Vostok space program. 
In June and July 1963, Sir Bernard Lovell, Director of the Jodrell Bank radio 
telescope facility, which was supposed to play a role in the Soviet-American 
communications satellite experiments championed by Blagonravov and Dryden and 
Frutkin, visited the Soviet Academy of Sciences.105 The Soviets gave him a tour of 
optical and radio observatories, something that had not yet been seen by any Westerner 
– or by many Soviet scientists, for that matter.106 Mstislav Keldysh, Presideent of the 
USSR Academy of Sciences, told Lovell that Soviet scientists were shifting focus 
toward unmanned moon exploration, given economic and safety difficulties in sending a 
manned mission, which some in the scientific community of the U.S. took to mean that 
the Soviets dropped out of the manned moon-race.107 Others, including Dryden, thought 
it was simply a ploy to get the U.S. to reveal their moon-mission plans to an 
international scientific body, and so it was determined the U.S. would go on as it had 
planned, to beat the Soviets to the moon with a manned mission, at least for the time 
being.108 Blagonravov and Dryden met in New York and discussed a cooperative lunar 
exploration in early September, 1963.109  
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Kennedy met with NASA Administrator James Webb on September 18, 1963 to 
enlist his help in bringing the rest of NASA on board with the idea of a cooperative 
moon flight.110 On September 20, Kennedy addressed the UN General Assembly and 
said that “space offers no problems of sovereignty… why, therefore should man’s first 
flight to the moon be a matter of national competition? Why should the United States 
and the Soviet Union, in preparing for such expeditions, become involved in immense 
duplications of research, construction, and expenditure,” suggesting that a joint 
expedition might be possible.111 This flip-flop between a competition for the moon 
between two ideological enemies, the perspective supported by the U.S. military and 
some in NASA, and the practicalities and possibilities of cooperation, championed by 
many in the scientific community both domestically and internationally, was a common 
theme within the Kennedy administration that would continue throughout the 
administrations of Kennedy’s successors.  
Unfortunately for Kennedy, although the speech was meant to improve political 
relations, the USSR ignored the proposal and did not even report it in the press.112 Even 
later Soviet accounts of the period omit this particular speech, while including 
Kennedy’s speeches at universities in prior months that lacked actual proposals to 
cooperate and simply expressed his support for a cooperative stance with the USSR.113 
In the U.S. public opinion was equally split between strong support and strong 
opposition for cooperation.114 NASA’s scientists had mixed reactions, as many saw 
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great possibility for cooperative ventures – in the view of Deputy Associate 
Administrator for Manned Space Flight George E. Mueller, space could be like 
Antarctica, where scientists worked together but, “they got there in different ships,” – 
while others, like Robert Gilruth, Director of the Manned Spacecraft Center, voiced 
concerns about the technical difficulties of integrating the two programs.115 Optimism 
for a joint mission stagnated as the U.S. public still wanted the U.S. to be the first to the 
moon, regardless of support for cooperation, and the attitude became concrete when 
Congress’s December appropriations bill said, “No part of any appropriation made 
available to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration by this Act shall be 
used for expenses of participating in a manned lunar landing to be carried out jointly by 
the United States and any other country without consent of Congress.”116 
The U.S. felt a shockwave when President Kennedy was assassinated on 
November 22, 1963. His vice president Lyndon B. Johnson took over and served until 
1969, taking a similar stance on the space program as Kennedy. By 1964, the KH-6 
program launched, sending its crafts into low orbit for excellent quality pictures, but 
had short craft lifespans due to the heat at the low altitudes.117  
 On October 12, 1964, the Voskhod (or “sunrise”) program launched the 
Voskhod 1 with three astronauts, Vladimir Komarov, Konstantin Yegorov, and Boris 
Feoktistov.118 Leonid Brezhnev took over as leader of the Soviet Union in October of 
1964, two days after the Voskhod 1 launch. On March 18, 1965, the Voskhod 2 took 
Pavel Belyayev and Alexey Leonov to space, which included the first spacewalk, 
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completed by Leonov.119 The U.S., meanwhile, continued its own separate missions, 
completing its own spacewalk in its June 1965 Gemini 4 mission with James McDivitt 
and Edward White.120 The competition for being the first to complete various activities 
in space continued between the Voskhod and Gemini programs. 
 In the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, meanwhile, 
cooperation was occurring in the creation of international space law. The 28 member 
nations of the Legal Subcommittee incorporated principles supported in prior General 
Assembly resolutions about similar international issues, and created the treaty during 
their Fifth Session from July 12 to August 4, 1966 and in New York from September 12 
to 16, 1966. They included in their discussions a recommendation by a 1959 American 
Bar Association resolution that stated, “in the common interest of mankind… celestial 
bodies should not be subject to exclusive appropriation;” a similar report by the UN Ad 
Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in 1959 that said “serious 
problems could arise if States claimed, on one ground or another, exclusive rights over 
all or part of a celestial body… some form of international administration over celestial 
bodies might be adopted;” the 1959 Antarctic Treaty; President Eisenhower’s 
September 1960 speech to the UNGA asserting American agreement that “celestial 
bodies are not subject to national appropriation by any claims of sovereignty… nations 
of the world shall not engage in warlike activities on these bodies… no nation will put 
into orbit or station in outer space weapons of mass destruction,” with verification 
power given to the UN; the 1961 UN Resolution 1721; and the 1963 Treaty Banning 
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Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water, which 
banned nuclear weapons testing “in the atmosphere, beyond its limits, including outer 
space.”121  
As the space race continued and a moon landing seemed increasingly possible, a 
sense of urgency arose surrounding the need to establish clear restraints on moon 
activities. Soviet spokesmen had been calling even more vocally than their American 
counterparts for peaceful uses of outer space and cooperation, as evidenced by the 
spokesman for the Soviet space program (who also had a close, friendly relationship 
with NASA’s Hugh Dryden) Leonid Sedov’s 1959 praising of peaceful uses of outer 
space as a means to ease military tensions, a sentiment which he continued to hold even 
into his 1971 statement that space research and international cooperation helps to create 
world peace.122 President Johnson’s May 7, 1966 speech urging the international 
community to create a treaty “to insure that explorations of the moon and other celestial 
bodies will be for peaceful purposes only… to be sure that our astronauts and those of 
other nations can freely conduct scientific investigations of the moon” reflected this 
sense of urgency.123 On December 8, 1966, these members announced they had 
finalized the text of a treaty to establish principles governing activities in outer space.124 
 On January 27, 1967, tragedy struck the U.S. space program when the Apollo 1 
mission on the Apollo Saturn-204, which sought a lunar landing, had a cabin fire during 
the ground test, killing all three of its crew through carbon monoxide asphyxiation: Gus 
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Grissom (third scheduled flight), Edward White (second scheduled flight), and Roger 
Chaffee.125 On April 23, 1967, the USSR had its own tragedy when its Soyuz 1 vehicle 
crashed due to parachute failure, killing Vladimir Komarov (second space flight) in the 
first in-flight fatality in spaceflight history.126 There were signs that the Soyuz 1 was 
imperfect, so much so that its creator, Vasili Mishin, refused to sign the paperwork 
permitting it to fly.127 But Mishin did not have the political clout Sergei Korolev or 
Wernher von Braun did and so Soviet leadership ordered the flight to take place as 
scheduled, coinciding with an important victory day celebration.128 Clearly, the 
politically-motivated competition sometimes had a dangerous consequence on both 
sides for the astronauts taking part.  
 On the evening of the Apollo 1 accident in 1967, President Johnson was with 
five veteran astronauts in Washington D.C., who watched him sign “The Outer Space 
Treaty,” officially known as “The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of 
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies.”129 The USSR agreed to the Treaty as well. In 1968 Brezhnev 
reiterated the Soviet position that space research be devoted to peaceful uses with the 
goal of international cooperation.130 
 Seeking to redeem itself after the Soyuz 1 disaster, the USSR first performed a 
successful docking of unmanned craft with the Cosmos 213 and Cosmos 212 in April, 
1968.131 Mishin suggested a mixed docking, with one manned and one unmanned craft 
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and on October 25, 1968, the unmanned Soyuz 2 lifted off to rendezvous and then dock 
with Georgy Beregovoi piloting the Soyuz 3.132 Although the docking was 
unsuccessful, possibly due to pilot error, it proved that the Soyuz could be a safe 
manned vehicle.133 
 By early 1968, Johnson was under pressure over the war in Vietnam, which 
seemed to be failing due to the military’s strategy of attrition, and yet the generals there 
requested an extra 206,000 troops.134 While the Tet Offensive proved to be a military 
failure for the Vietcong, it proved a political success as U.S. public support for the war 
dropped dramatically, striking a blow to the Johnson administration; the My Lai 
Massacre shattered much remaining support.135 Meanwhile, NASA was facing hardship 
trying to get its Saturn V up and running.136 Luckily, by the end of 1967, they had 
gotten a successful first flight of the Saturn V and on October 6, 1968, NASA launched 
the Apollo 7 with a Saturn 1B rocket, carrying Walter Schirra (third spaceflight), Donn 
Eisele, and R. Walter Cunningham.137 
 On October 14, 1968, Academician Leonid Sedov told the Congress of the 
International Astronautical Foundation that sending astronauts to the moon was not a 
priority for the USSR at that time.138 Korolev had been planning for a Soviet moon 
mission ever since Kennedy’s speech, but rocket fuel problems ultimately slowed 
development of a moon mission.139 On November 10, 1968, the USSR’s Zond 6 carried 
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a biological payload to the moon and back, which killed the specimens it carried, but 
also pushed the U.S. to work faster on the Apollo 8.140 
 On December 21, 1968, the Apollo 8, using the Saturn V rocket, took Frank 
Borman, James Lovell, and William Anders to orbit the moon.141 This was ultimately 
the sign that the U.S. won the race to the moon. It paved the way (along with the Apollo 
9, in which Rusty Schweickart tested the spacesuit by climbing out of the lunar module 
hatch, and the Apollo 10, which served as a dress rehearsal for the Apollo 11 with 
Thomas Stafford, John Young, and Eugene Cernan) for Neil Armstrong, Mike Collins, 
and Buzz Aldrin to take the Apollo 11 to the Moon on July 20, 1969.142  
On January 14, 1969, the USSR’s Soyuz 4 with Vladimir Shatalov and Soyuz 5 
carrying Boris Volynov, Aleksei Yeliseyev, and Yevgeny Khrunov rendezvoused and 
docked in space, where Yeliseyev and Khrunov walked to the Soyuz 4 and then parted, 
with Volynov piloting the Soyuz 5 alone back to earth and Shatalov, Yeliseyev, and 
Khrunov coming back in the Soyuz 4.143 This successful flight followed the tragedy of 
the Soyuz 1 and its cancelled docking attempted with the Soyuz 2.144 But the USSR 
would continue investment in its space program even after the Apollo 11 won the space 
race, at least in terms of propaganda. 
 Concluding Thoughts on the Era That Started It All 
In March 1967, Lyndon Johnson said to a group of government officials, “we’ve 
spent thirty-five or forty billion dollars on the space program. And if nothing else had 
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come out of it except the knowledge we’ve gained from space photography, it would be 
worth ten times what the whole program has cost. Because tonight we know how many 
missiles the enemy has.”145 This statement illustrates the nature of the space race 
throughout the 1950s and 60s. It was a time of competition and obsession with security 
against the enemy, be it the USSR or US. Just as the USSR used its space program to 
promulgate its socialist ideology, boosted by Tereshkova’s orbit, the US, too, used its 
space programs to show the superiority of its own technology and ideology of 
capitalism.146  
After the IGY kicked off the true race with Sputnik 1, the activities of the US 
and USSR in space throughout the rest of the 1950s and 60s were clearly militaristic 
and propaganda-fueling. Both governments kept more hushed, but equally as important 
reconnaissance satellite programs that sought to boost the respective militaries of each. 
The technology boost of the 1960s produced an extraordinary reconnaissance 
capability, which naturally went hand-in-hand with military, rather than scientific 
operations.147 Often, the information the reconnaissance missions gathered, using 
photographic satellite capabilities, assisted in considerations of arms control treaties and 
restraints.148 Military commanders have attempted to gain intelligence about the enemy 
by getting a look from as high in the sky as possible for centuries; Chinese and Japanese 
folklore includes “spotters” who spied on the enemy from baskets hanging from kites 
high in the air and 1794 France used spies in balloons to watch the enemy, organized 
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into a company of aérostiers.149 World War I established the usefulness of aerial 
reconnaissance with planes, so the extension into space was a natural desire for 
militaries.150 
By 1968 Robert B. Hotz, editor-in-chief of Aviation Week & Space Technology, 
had written, “The massive competition between the space programs of the United States 
and the Soviet Union is one of the most significant events of modern times.”151 The 
1968 Review of the Soviet Space Program for which Hotz wrote this statement as part 
of a foreword lists a sort of tallying chart by which it keeps score for the countries 
involved in space from 1957-October 4, 1967. It lists successes of U.S. launch vehicles 
(388 overall), Soviet launch vehicles (221), French launch vehicles (4), and Italian 
launch vehicles (1), along with successful payloads to Earth orbit, which have a similar 
breakdown by country, and successful “escape payloads to moon, beyond” which lists 
the U.S. with 26 and the USSR with 21.152 Failures are scarcer, likely due to less 
available data, and lack much breakdown by year, but overall list failed U.S. launch 
vehicles (84), Soviet launch vehicles (497), and Japanese launch vehicles (3), with a 
similar listing for payloads to Earth orbit, and failed “escape payloads to moon, 
beyond” as U.S. (10) and USSR (“14+?”).153 This score-keeping shows the limited 
number of actors in the space race of the 50s and 60s. Although France, Italy, and Japan 
make an appearance, the real competition was limited to the US and the USSR, which 
used the frontier of space as an extension of their competitive rivalry on the Earth. 
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The 1970s: Cooperation of the Apollo and Soyuz 
After the United States won the race to the moon, the USSR continued to land 
automated rovers called Lunokhods on the moon, but these were not effective 
propaganda tools, as the world was still most impressed by the U.S. moon landing.154 In 
the post-moonwalk world, the USSR turned its attention toward its Soyuz craft, which 
would become the most-used manned spacecraft of all time.155 Its current version with 
an updated R-7 continues to shuttle astronauts from many different nations into space in 
the present day.156 Soyuz, which means “union,” was Korolev’s brainchild and arguably 
greatest achievement, although he gave that title to his Voskhod 2 mission of 1965.157 
While Neil Armstrong in Gemini 8 had docked with an unmanned vehicle in 1966 and 
the Soviet Cosmos 186 and 188 had docked unmanned, it made sense that the spacecraft 
called “union” would run the USSR’s first manned docking and exchange of crew 
members between vehicles.158 Korolev’s Soyuz 19 would go on to be used in the 
Apollo-Soyuz Test Project of 1975 with the U.S.’s Apollo vehicle. The 1970s largely 
continued the military satellite production of the 1960s, but was ultimately defined by 
the first major joint project between the USSR and the US – the Apollo-Soyuz Test 
Project. 
 On April 11, 1970, the Apollo 13 launched with Jim Lovell (fourth space flight), 
Jack Swigert, and Fred Haise, nearly facing disaster due to various technical issues, but 
their remarkable recovery was largely eclipsed in the U.S. public’s eye by the 
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increasingly unpopular Vietnam War.159 Meanwhile Keldysh and NASA Administrator 
Thomas Paine had been corresponding about the development of compatible equipment 
and procedures for a cooperative spaceflight.160 Soviet officials were far more receptive 
to cooperation in this post-moon landing era. On July 10, 1970, President Nixon 
publicly stated support for space cooperation and suggested that negotiations between 
the USSR and US on a technical level should begin.161  
In August, the Advanced Manned Missions Planning Group in NASA’s Office 
of Manned Space Flight was assigned to develop a compatible docking system. This 
staff worked out the Apollo-Soyuz docking capabilities and requirements and suggested 
that, although the USSR could not participate in Skylab A due to time and hardware 
restraints, but it could absolutely match the systems for later Skylab and Space Station 
flights if the Soviets were interested. Paine pursued the suggestions and wrote to 
Keldysh to suggest the Soyuz rendezvous with Skylab. On September 23, Academician 
Keldysh responded and suggested they begin talks in Moscow in October or November, 
which Paine accepted.162 NASA officials and Soviet officials, along with technical 
specialists and astronauts from both countries met in Moscow to draft a cooperative 
space venture agreement, which they signed on October 28, 1970.163 In 1971, Arnold 
Frutkin and George Low met with Keldysh and Feoktistov to discuss the possibility of a 
compatible docking system with the Apollo and Soyuz.164 
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 On April 19, 1971, the USSR launched the first space station, the Salyut 1 and 
on April 23, the Soyuz 10 went into orbit and docked with Salyut 1.165 Space stations’ 
primary purpose at this point was to be an information gathering, processing, 
transmission, and dissemination tool to support satellite operations and to help with 
earthly functions like weather, ecological, and agricultural observation.166 The 
possibility of military use, however, remained on the radar, as scholars pointed out that 
only explicitly attack-focused military capabilities and not self-defense-related military 
capabilities were prohibited in the Outer Space Treaty.167  
Meanwhile, Soviet scientists continued to work on docking options with NASA, 
visiting Houston in June 1971. They decided to focus on a docking mission with Apollo 
and “a manned orbital scientific station of the Salyut type,” with a later possible 
docking flight between Soyuz and Skylab.168 Docking research to support the 
cooperative venture went less-than-smoothly with the Soviet Soyuz 11 depressurization, 
killing its crew, and the American Apollo 14 operation difficulty with service and lunar 
module docking, but efforts continued nonetheless.169 James Chipman Fletcher became 
Administrator of NASA on April 27, 1971 and announced his support for closer 
cooperation with the USSR.170 
 Brezhnev and Nixon (who had taken office in 1969) met multiple times in 
Helsinki and Vienna for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which sought to 
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reduce both countries’ ballistic missile stocks.171 This was part of a general détente, a 
cooling of hostilities between the USSR and the US. Scientists had been sharing 
information between the two countries for many years, exchanging lunar soil specimens 
and biomedical data. Détente facilitated expansion of the existing cooperation and by 
1973 this improvement in relations created the Prevention of Nuclear War 
Agreement.172  
The political climate began to match this scientific relationship in the making of 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, at which point the US and USSR agreed upon the 
Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, in which an Apollo spacecraft with three men would dock 
with a Soyuz spacecraft with two men mid-orbit. On May 24, 1972 Nixon and the 
USSR’s Premier Alexei Kosygin signed the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project agreement, with 
some trepidation that the other side might not follow through.173 The Soviets were very 
opaque in their dealings, for a while refusing to let Stafford, one of the Apollo 
crewmembers, visit the Tyuratam Cosmodrome and see the Soyuz. A major difference 
between the Soviet and American space programs was that the Soviet manned program 
was entirely under the arm of the military, while the American manned programs were 
run by the civilian organization, NASA (although the CIA and Air Force ran much of 
the non-manned space agenda of the U.S.).174 This helps in part to explain their less-
transparent nature in dealing with their cooperative partner. 
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 Skylab launched in 1973 as the US’s first space station. In November 1974, 
President Ford signed a SALT accord with Premier Brezhnev.175 Although it did not 
lead to a treaty, this accord did show the agreement between Brezhnev and Ford about 
limiting arms on both sides.176 At the same time, the U.S. was introducing new ICBMs 
– the Minuteman III in 1969 and Minuteman IV in 1974 – while the USSR was building 
five new classes of ICBMs and upgrading those classes at least seven times.177 While 
the political spirit of disarmament and cooperation was there, military fears still loomed 
heavily behind the diplomacy moves. 
 To prepare for cooperation, on December 2, 1974 Anatoli Filipchenko and 
Nikolai Rukavishnikov went into orbit on the Soyuz 16, which the U.S. was tracking 
and monitoring, and practiced the systems and procedures for the Apollo-Soyuz Test 
Project.178 Due to the differing natures of the US and USSR’s manned space programs, 
some issues arose even in this early stage of cooperation: the USSR let NASA know 
about Soyuz 16 and offered to give advance notice of the launch as long as NASA 
promised not to reveal anything to the press. But this broke with NASA’s tradition of 
transparency and so the head of the American side of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, 
Glynn Lunney, told his Soviet counterpart that NASA would rather know nothing about 
Soyuz 16 because they would tell the American press.179 To combat the press issue with 
the Apollo-Soyuz project, Low had included a line in his agreement with Vladimir 
Kotelnikov of the Russian Academy of Science in April 1972 that stated that the two 
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countries would develop a public information plan together that “takes into account the 
obligations and practices of both sides.”180 After much correspondence and multiple 
long meetings face-to-face, a compromise arose: Soviet correspondents would be 
limited in number, in order to facilitate the limitation of information in the USSR, and 
American correspondents would be promised full freedom and access, although this all 
turned out easier said than done.181 
 NASA and Soviet scientists worked hard for years in preparation for the Apollo-
Soyuz Mission, astronauts trained in Russian and English and practiced the procedures, 
and on July 15, 1975, the mission finally launched.182 The Soyuz launched first and the 
Apollo launched to meet it later that day. After some troubleshooting on July 16, the 
two crafts rendezvoused and docked on July 17.183 Stafford entered the Soyuz, greeted 
by Leonov, and then Stafford, Slayton, Leonov, and Kubasov symbolically exchanged 
gifts before sitting down for the first joint space banquet.184 On July 18, Kubasov and 
Brand broadcasted from “your Soviet/American TV center in space,” giving a tour of 
the Soyuz, and Stafford gave Leonov and the Soviet viewers a Russian language tour of 
the Apollo.185 Kubasov said in English, in a travelogue, “Dear American TV people, it 
would be wrong to ask which country’s more beautiful. It would be right to say there is 
nothing more beautiful than our blue planet.”186 After a few days of exercises together 
and separately, the two parties bid farewell on July 21, ran more experiments on the 22-
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23, and came back to Earth on July 24.187 This event can be considered the closing of 
the space race chapter for the Soviet Union and U.S. It marked the first real cooperation 
between the two in outer space and foreshadowed cooperation to come. 
 While this cooperative venture was taking place, the US was cooperating with 
other non-Soviet allied countries, in particular Norway and Australia, with its 
reconnaissance and surveillance activities against the USSR.188 By the time Carter took 
over as the US President in 1977, satellites had advanced to where they could produce 
what was called “real-time imaging.”189 The Soviet Union caught up to the US in terms 
of weaponry stock and capabilities.190 The USSR had a large stock of ICBMs totaling 
1600 missiles by 1975, which they cut back slightly in favor of more accurate missiles 
by the later 1970s.191  
 In 1979 the US’s Skylab fell back to Earth. In the same year, President Carter 
signed the SALT II accord with Premier Brezhnev.192 Many in the U.S., however, 
argued that the USSR “ignored the spirit of the treaties,” as David Pahl writes in his 
book about the Strategic Defense Initiative of the 1980s, which coincided with a fear 
that the USSR might develop effective anti-ballistic missile defense, thus ending the 
promise of effective retaliation in the event of a nuclear attack and ruining 
deterrence.193 Both the US and USSR had an impressive arsenal of ICBMs and were 
continuing development of the weapons that would give each the better strategic 
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foothold.194 The U.S. tended to have better weapons technology, spurring the USSR to 
create a more sizable weaponry stock to make up the difference. Likewise, though, the 
US feared the USSR’s great number of weapons; Pahl writes that  
the Soviet arsenal of equipment – both conventional and nuclear – has grown to 
the point where it exceeds the combined inventories of all of NATO (including 
the United States) and the People’s Republic of China… the quantity of Russian 
goods more than makes up for any disparity in quality. With this in mind and 
ignoring the Soviet nuclear missile threat, the size and quality of the Russian 
conventional force is such that their military leaders would likely be capable of 
advancing through the NATO defenses almost with impunity.195  
 
Pahl’s assessment reflects the reality of the military build-up as well as the fear of the 
Soviet capabilities that the U.S. was harboring by the end of the 1970s. This helped to 
corrode the spirit of trust and cooperation the Apollo-Soyuz mission cultivated and 
brought in the new decade on a nervous, warlike note. 
The 1980s: Another Space Race 
The Apollo-Soyuz was one flicker of cooperation that quickly dimmed as the 
1980s rolled around and relations between the US and USSR soured.196 In November 
1982 Yuri Andropov took over after Brezhnev’s death as leader of the Soviet Union.197 
Reagan campaigned for the US presidency on the promise of bringing the US military 
into the first place spot, lamenting that the US was neither the world’s strongest nor 
largest military power as it was second to the USSR.198 Reagan blamed this in part on 
the quest for disarmament, which was disproportionately cutting down the US’s military 
capabilities compared to the USSR’s.199 U.S. public opinion and politics had once again 
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swung back toward a fear of Soviet aggression and mistrust.200 Reagan won the 
presidency in November 1980 and Congress backed (at times reluctantly) the move 
toward suspending arms control negotiations and boosting U.S. arms until the U.S. was 
on par or exceeded the USSR before it renegotiated disarmament.201 Naturally, this shift 
made it difficult to convince the USSR to reduce arms as the US increased its own. It 
became even more difficult when NATO, the UK, and France each began programs to 
modernize their own nuclear retaliatory forces.202 In arms limitation discussions in the 
early 1980s, the U.S. demanded drastic reductions in the most effective and modern 
Soviet weapons, while refusing to reduce its own stocks at a comparable rate.203  
The relationship between the USSR and the US soured and both accused the 
other of seeking the first strike advantage.204 From the Soviet perspective, both sides 
had been operating in the spirit of détente, until suddenly the U.S. decided to rebuild 
their arms and create an environment of confrontation.205 To try and force the other side 
to concede to renegotiation of disarmament, both countries ran a series of non-secret 
weapons tests to show their own might.206 Premier Andropov refused to speak with 
President Reagan following the US test of Cruise missiles, instead stating in 1983 that 
this deployment “destroyed the very bases on which it was possible to seek an 
agreement.”207 In March of 1983 President Reagan announced a research and 
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development project called the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which would rival the 
Kennedy era in its demands on the scientific community in the U.S.208 This highly 
aggressive announcement came from the USs discovery of the Krasnoyarsk radar 
facility and the Soviet’s testing of the a series of SS-20 missiles on a trajectory toward 
the US, which the USSR destroyed and labelled “tests” before they could do damage, 
but left the US leadership with what they perceived to be a warning.209 SDI sought to 
lessen the perceived gap in capabilities between the US and the USSR and provide 
some level of defense as offensive capabilities were already quite advanced.210 
 The U.S. ran various Spacelab missions to conduct experiments in space starting 
in 1983. In President Reagan’s 1984 State of the Union speech, he announced his plan 
for NASA to create a permanently manned space station, which would come to be 
known as the Space Station Freedom.211 That same year the Strategic Defense Initiative 
Organization was established in the Department of Defense to manage SDI efforts.212 
SDI, which sought to end the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) nuclear deterrence 
strategy by giving the U.S. a proper defense system, set the early 1990s as the goal for 
development of defense technologies.213 SDI was meant to produce a deterrent against 
any Soviet rapid expansion of anti-ballistic missile systems beyond those which the 
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty established.214 Andropov decried the SDI 
announcement, saying that space-based defense “would open the floodgates of a 
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runaway race of all types of strategic arms, both offensive and defensive… 
Washington’s actions are putting the entire world in jeopardy.”215 Reagan later offered 
SDI not only to the U.S.’s allies, but to the USSR as well, in order to boost the U.S.’s 
image of being a contributor of global peace and security.216 It was also a strategic 
move on Reagan’s part, as he knew the USSR would have to attempt to keep up with 
the U.S. in the arms race and that any defense program would cost the Soviets more 
than they could afford, with an already shriveling economy.217 
Also in the 1984 State of the Union address, Reagan gave support to the space 
station program, which sought a permanently manned station by 1991.218 Reagan called 
for American allies to take part in the program and in March 1984 NASA Administrator 
James Beggs met with European and Japanese officials to discuss cooperation on a 
space station project.219 In April, NASA’s Space Station Program Office was 
established and it called for design proposals from the aerospace industry in 
September.220 The European Space Agency agreed to contribute in 1985 and Japan and 
Canada joined in the project in 1986.221 The U.S. had tragedy strike when its Space 
Shuttle Challenger exploded in January 1986, and this resulted in the push-back of the 
planned space station launch until 1995.222 This delay would inadvertently end up 
allowing Russia to take part in the space station project after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, which will be discussed in the next section.  
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Under Reagan’s administration, the U.S. space program became more concerned 
with defensive capabilities and surveillance and reconnaissance satellites. The 
importance of reconnaissance satellites to the U.S. was clear in the allocation of money: 
The National Reconnaissance Office had the largest budget of any intelligence 
organization – five billion dollars – in 1985.223 The USSR had a similar outlook on the 
proper uses of space and technology in the 1980s as it feared (and later faced) Western 
pressures and collapse.   
By early 1984 the USSR was facing a major economic and military challenge in 
Afghanistan, where Russian forces and resources were funneled in at a fast pace to try 
and fight a powerful insurgency and the Soviet economy could not keep up with the 
demands of the renewed arms race, leaving its people to suffer with food shortages.224 
In February Andropov died and was succeeded by Konstantin Chernenko.225 
Chernenko’s poor health meant he often handed over control in meetings to his Head of 
the Secretariat, Mikhail Gorbachev, who took over the premiership upon Chernenko’s 
death in March 1985.226 The quick turnover of Soviet leaders – three premiers dead 
within three years – meant that little positive, meaningful dialogue occurred between 
the US and USSR on a large scale from the early to mid-1980s and American scientists 
directed a majority of their cooperative discussions toward American allies for the space 
station project.227 The lack of large-scale dialogue was perhaps justified for the Soviet 
leaders regardless, as Reagan’s National Security Directives (particularly NSDD 32 in 
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1981) placed secret economic and diplomatic pressures on the USSR in an effort to, as 
some commentators put it, deliberately “attempt to murder the Soviet Union.”228 Still, 
not all scientific dialogue ended during the early to mid-1980s. Low-level cooperative 
programs, like a medical device sharing and experimentation program led by Soviet 
academician Oleg Gazenko and Anatoly Grigoriev and NASA scientist Arnauld 
Nicogossian, and the coordination of U.S.-Canadian-French SARSAT with Soviet 
COSPAS satellites for search and rescue efforts continued throughout the 1980s.229 
Gorbachev’s premiership brought in a new era in US-Soviet relations, as he was 
more receptive to discussions with American leadership; Vice President George H.W. 
Bush and Secretary of State George Shultz met with Gorbachev at Chernenko’s funeral 
and reported back to Reagan that he was someone with whom they could “do 
business.”230 Unlike previous leaders, Gorbachev, apparently unafraid of revealing the 
USSR’s weaknesses in public, visited with and asked the people about their needs, 
which focused on the terrible economy.231 Gorbachev called for perestroika 
(“restructuring”) to fix the economy and glasnost (“publicity”) to allow the public 
greater say in the actions of the government.232 The rest of the Communist leadership 
was less approving of these reforms and of Gorbachev’s willingness to meet and work 
with Reagan.233  
Reagan held his positions steadfast, forcing Gorbachev to make concessions, 
which further angered the rest of the Soviet regime.234 As Reagan applied pressure to 
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“drive the Communists out of Afghanistan” by giving $300 million in military aid to the 
Mujahidin and began to cut off communication with the USSR, Gorbachev’s hopes for 
a summit in June 1986 vanished.235 Along with the failing counterinsurgency in 
Afghanistan, Soviet leadership found evidence of Islamic insurrection spreading into 
Tajikistan within the Soviet Union, and the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in Ukraine in 
1986 turned out to have a much larger impact than it initially appeared, including 
revealing the USSR’s bankruptcy.236  
On a positive note, the USSR launched the base block for the Mir (meaning 
“peace”) space station on February 19, 1986, which had multiple docking ports and 
could accept large, permanent scientific modules, using the Soyuz as the cargo carrier 
from earth, as it had with the Salyut.237 Gorbachev sought to end the Cold War threat in 
order to shift attention toward the domestic economic and political corruption problems 
plaguing the USSR and so he offered a huge unilateral cut in nuclear missiles in 1988, 
although many within the Soviet leadership disagreed with this move.238 
In the U.S., negotiations with its foreign partners for the space station project 
finished, with 12 countries signing a participation agreement in 1988 and on September 
29 the U.S. Space Shuttle began flying again for the first time after Challenger.239  In 
1989 President Bush approved the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) to return man to 
the moon and plan a manned mission to Mars, although it was never implemented.240 
The Mir station in the USSR on the other hand faced enormous setbacks due to the 
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tumultuous political environment on Earth.241 Funds previously allocated did not turn 
up, leaving Soyuz launches to the Mir delayed or cancelled.242 Mir, which was 
supposed to be permanently manned, had a few extended periods in which it was not 
manned at all due to political uncertainty and budget shortages.243 
Change was happening too fast in the Soviet Union and was causing massive 
instability; Reagan and Gorbachev agreed to meet in December 1988 for a small 
summit to discuss the future.244 By 1989, Gorbachev’s reforms favoring “freedom of 
choice” in elections allowed uprisings in Eastern Europe and held support in other areas 
of the communist bloc.245 Hungary and Czechoslovakia began a reform process and 
border fences between East and West came down with no one disallowing escapes to 
the West.246 When the Berlin Wall came down, many in the West, including the 
administration of the new President George H.W. Bush, were in disbelief, and one by 
one communist governments were toppled.247  
In December 1989 Bush and Gorbachev met for a summit in Malta, which 
marked the end of the Cold War and included American economic initiatives aimed at 
helping the Soviet Union.248 At the meeting, Gorbachev told Bush that the Soviet Union 
wanted America as a partner, “not as an enemy… things have changed… The Soviet 
Union will never start a new war against the United States… we should cooperate.”249 
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This was the note on which the last decade of the Cold War ended and an entirely new 
decade of soon to be Russian-American relations entered. 
The 1990s 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 opened the door to the possibility of 
better U.S.-Russian relations and greater cooperation in space. President George H.W. 
Bush transferred the Strategic Defense Initiative into the Global Protection Against 
Limited Strikes (GPALS) to defend against “purposeful strikes by various Third World 
powers developing ballistic missiles, or accidental or unauthorized launches from the 
U.S.S.R.”250 When the Soviet Union collapsed, SDI was irrelevant in its original form 
and even GPALS lost one of its probable enemies.251 SDI was, in a sense, mothballed as 
it had received $20.9 billion from 1985 to 1991 and the technology it produced was 
stored in case of later use.252  
NASA had continued to run scientific missions in the late 1980s, even as it ran 
defense-related projects, raising important scientific and political issues like nuclear 
power, which many scientists saw as necessary to the future of space operations, but 
which loomed heavily in the political sphere after the Chernobyl disaster.253 The use of 
American intelligence satellites also remained, even as the Soviet Union began to 
crumble.254 In October 1990, Congress cut the space station budget by six billion 
dollars, causing NASA to redesign the project.255 That same year the U.S. launched the 
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Hubble Space Telescope, which had been on the radar for development immediately 
following World War II, but which Congress deemed too costly and of lesser 
importance in the context of the space race with the Soviet Union.256 The Soviet 
Union’s demise allowed the U.S. space program to justify more scientific, less 
militaristic expenses and ultimately paved the way for a new era of cooperation in 
space.  
A 1995 Office of Technology Assessment for the U.S. Congress titled “U.S.-
Russian Cooperation in Space” concluded that the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed 
for increased dialogue between states of the Former Soviet Union (FSU), which led to 
cooperative space programs with Russia “that would have been unimaginable just a few 
years ago.”257 The main cooperative ventures to begin in this period were the Space 
Shuttle-Space Station Mir dockings and the International Space Station (ISS).258 The 
primary reasons for cooperation, Office of Technology Assessment Director Roger C. 
Herdman explains, are not necessarily technological necessity, but that it helped to 
stabilize the Russian economy and it provided an incentive for technological elites to 
stay in Russia and work on peaceful space projects rather than finding employment 
outside of Russia and contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(which their skills would allow them to do, with a good paycheck in return).259 
Naturally the expansion of U.S.-Russian space cooperation did provide a scientific and 
technological benefit as well on top of the political and economic.260 The U.S. brought 
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Russia into the group of nations that had already agreed to work on the International 
Space Station Project, which initially caused some tension between the U.S. and its 
original ISS partners.261 
Russia’s Mir space station, which in 1991 was only expected to survive to 
around 1996, continued to operate with teams of cosmonauts manning it until August 
1999.262 In 1991-1992 the Soviet Union/Russia signed agreements with the German 
national space agency, European Space Agency, and the French national space agency 
to allow them to do short missions to Mir and then a longer mission for the European 
Space Agency, allowing many Europeans to train at Star City (the cosmonaut training 
center’s home) in Russia.263 The Russian space program ran its first manned mission on 
March 17, 1992 with a German cosmonaut in its crew.264 It is interesting to note that 
this mission brought cosmonaut Sergei Krikalev back to Earth as a Russian citizen after 
a May 1991 mission took him to Mir as a Soviet citizen, where he stayed for nearly a 
year.265 The new Russian space program was notable for its foundation of international 
cooperation, beginning with European space programs. 
On June 17, 1992 U.S. President George H.W. Bush and Russian President 
Boris Yeltsin signed an agreement to initiate cooperative manned space programs, 
which became the basis for future space program agreements between Russia and the 
U.S.266 That year the U.S. launched its newest orbiter, the Space Shuttle Endeavour, 
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flew.267 In 1993 NASA Administrator Dan Goldin and Roscosmos (the Russian Space 
Agency) General Director Yuri Koptev agreed upon a series of Shuttle docking 
missions to Mir to eventually bring the Russians onboard an international space station 
effort.268 They also agreed to examine whether the Freedom station, which was still in 
design and production, could have a Soyuz docking port.269 President Clinton called for 
the redesign of the space station Freedom in 1993 to decrease costs and incorporate 
more international involvement.270 NASA called the new project Alpha and Russia 
agreed to supply hardware that it had intended for its Mir 2 space station program.271 
And so following the talks between Koptev and Goldin, the Mir 2 and Freedom projects 
morphed into one joint project – the International Space Station.272   
When President Clinton took over in 1993, he declared the U.S.’s support for 
Russia in the second reset with Russia, after Bush’s dealings with them in the post-
Soviet context.273 He sought to improv democracy within Russia and facilitate its 
economic conversion to an American market-oriented model.274 Clinton continued 
Bush’s goal of decreasing the nuclear threat of FSU countries.275 Clinton and President 
Yeltsin disagreed over Russian support for Iran’s nuclear program, causing a rift 
between the two in cooperative negotiations.276 
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On February 8, 1994, the U.S. Space Shuttle Discovery (including a Russian 
cosmonaut among the crew) linked up with the Russian Mir space station; Good 
Morning America broadcast the event live, as the event marked the first real cooperation 
in action since the Apollo-Soyuz mission in 1975.277 Over the course of the three-year 
Shuttle-Mir program, the U.S. Shuttle docked with Russia’s Mir nine times, serving as 
an introduction to long-duration missions for astronauts who would go on to work in the 
International Space Station.278 In March 1996, the U.S. Shuttle Atlantis took astronaut 
Shannon Lucid to Mir to stay for six months – the first long-duration shuttle drop of a 
crew member to a space station.279 In August 1996 Atlantis and Mir exchanged Lucid 
for John Blaha, delivering supplies, equipment, and water.280 
On January 29, 1998, representatives from the U.S., Russia, Japan, Canada, and 
the participating European Space Agency countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom) signed the Intergovernmental Agreement on Space Station Cooperation.281 
The U.S. also signed bilateral memoranda of understanding with Russia and Canada, 
then later with Japan on February 24.282 These agreements superseded the 1988 
agreements with the U.S., Europe, Japan, and Canada, reflecting the importance of 
Russian cooperation in the post-Soviet world.283 Space station assembly began with the 
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Zarya control module launch using a Russian rocket on November 20, 1998.284 The 
Zarya mission provided the ISS with its battery power and fuel storage and was 
followed by the shuttle Endeavour on December 4, bringing the Unity node to attach to 
Zarya, which created the station.285 On May 27, 1999 the shuttle Discovery launched to 
bring research supplies to the laboratory on board the ISS.286 
The 2000s to Present 
NASA, still not entirely trusting the Russian space industry, mostly due to the 
weaker Russian economy, allotted money to projects that could replace Russia’s 
projects in their joint missions, should Russia fail. One such NASA project was the 
$210 million US Naval Laboratory Interim Control Module (ICM) for the International 
Space Station, which served as a back-up in case Russia’s Zvezda service module failed 
to dock in July 2000.287 Some of these projects, like the ICM, had been previously 
designed in the 1980s when the U.S. did not have joint space projects with the USSR, 
but were developed in the late 1990s and early 2000s, doubling the total work (and the 
overall cost) put into the ISS.288 
In the 2000s, various U.S. defense contractors began to buy Russian rocket 
engines for use with American military rockets, gradually replacing American rocket 
engine technology in favor of the RD-180 engines on satellites – including secretive 
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surveillance and reconnaissance satellites.289 Use of the RD-180 has become so 
extensive that in the present the U.S. is completely reliant on the technology.290 As 
Russian-American tensions over issues like Ukraine and Syria have heightened, some in 
Congress are unhappy with the reliance – particularly those to whom SpaceX 
financially contributes, including Senator John McCain – and argue that American 
companies should develop a rocket engine replacement.291 On the other hand, 
companies like Boeing and Lockheed are reliant on Russian RD-180 engines and do not 
want to wait for SpaceX to develop a potentially costly alternative; their lobbying 
capabilities match (if not exceed) that of SpaceX and other members of Congress to 
whom they contribute, including Senator Richard Shelby and Senator Richard Durbin, 
have blocked attempts to ban the use of the RD-180.292 
In 2000, President Clinton addressed Russian parliament and met with President 
Putin at the G8 summit about their continued disagreements surrounding the Iranian 
nuclear program and Chechnya, among other issues.293 That year also saw the first crew 
on the manned ISS on November 2.294 The 9/11 attacks in 2001 set the stage for the 
third reset in Russian-U.S. relations, when President Putin was the first leader to call 
President George W. Bush to offer support for an anti-terrorism campaign.295 Relations 
worsened a bit, however, when Russia felt rebuffed at Bush’s lack of serious interest in 
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Russian cooperation in anti-terrorism.296 A hopeful President Bush met with other 
members of NATO and with President Putin to create a NATO-Russia council in May 
2002.297 Relations for the remainder of Bush’s term were mainly business related or 
somewhat toothless nuclear terrorism agreements.298 
After the 2008 Russian war with Georgia, U.S.-Russian relations hit a low, and 
so U.S. President Barack Obama sent Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to symbolically 
reset relations in a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.299 Nuclear 
arms control and missile defense; WMD nonproliferation, and in particular Iran’s 
nuclear program and the North Korean nuclear program; the U.S. and Russian roles in 
the FSU; European security issues and NATO’s expansion; and Russian domestic issues 
like the wars in Chechnya are the main issues that increasingly plague U.S.-Russian 
relations, which have worsened over time.300  
In June 2010, President Obama met with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev at 
Ray’s Hell Burgers in Virginia for a laid-back summit in which they discussed 
technological advancements and announced a U.S.-Russian partnership for 
innovation.301 By June 2012 relations had soured a bit, and President Obama met 
Russian President Vladimir Putin for their first meeting during the G-20 summit, where 
they privately discussed missile defense and the crisis in Syria.302 Then in 2013, Edward 
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Snowden leaked classified information and was given asylum in Russia.303 President 
Obama cancelled his next planned summit with President Putin in September 2013 and 
President Putin stated publicly that he and Obama, “simply don’t agree. I don’t agree 
with his arguments and he doesn’t agree with mine.”304 Following Russia’s annexation 
of Crimea, members of the G8 ousted Russia from the group, turning it into the G7 on 
the basis of Russia’s violation of international law protecting territorial integrity and 
creating further distance between Russia and the U.S.305 It seems that each new U.S. 
president and every Russian president entering the post for the first time has held a high 
expectation for U.S.-Russian relations in their term, only to be met with the reality of 
recurring issues in relations.306 
In March 2011, NASA retired Shuttle Discovery, in June Shuttle Endeavor, and 
in August Shuttle Atlantis.307 NASA had lost Shuttle Columbia in February 2003 and 
Shuttle Challenger in January 1986.308 On August 31, 2011 NASA’s space shuttle 
program officially ended after more than 30 years.309 The retirement was meant to allow 
greater resource allocation to sending astronauts to an asteroid, the moon, and Mars.310 
The lack of a shuttle meant that NASA could no longer send its astronauts to the ISS.311 
The U.S. turned to Russia for transporting its supplies and crew to and from the ISS 
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using the Soyuz spacecraft.312 The Soyuz spacecraft continues to be the sole means of 
transport to the ISS for the United States to the present.313  
The contemporary level of cooperation, with the U.S. relying on Russia to get to 
an international space station they share with other nations, starkly contrasts with the 
animosity and secrecy of the space race of the 1960s. NASA, however, made sure to 
state that although the cancellation of the shuttle program would mean complete 
cooperation with Russia for the time being, “from day one, the Obama Administration 
made clear that the greatest nation on Earth should not be dependent on other nations to 
get into space,” in NASA Administrator Charlie Bolden’s words.314  
In 2014, NASA awarded contracts to Boeing ($4.2 billion for the CST-100) and 
SpaceX ($2.6 billion for the Crew Dragon), which would allow NASA to end its 
reliance on the Soyuz with a goal of 2017.315 Since this announcement, however, 
Boeing delayed its first crewed flight until 2018 due to technical issues.316 After the 
SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket exploded on the launch pad during a refueling operation, its 
Crew Dragon spacecraft has also been delayed until 2018.317 NASA Administrator 
Bolden blamed Congress for the reliance on Roscosmos, which costs $490 million, 
because Congress reduced funding to the agency and so it was unable to create a 
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replacement for the shuttle.318 For now, even amidst allegations of hacking, sanctions, 
disagreement over territorial disputes/annexations, and involvement in conflicts in the 
Middle East, Russia and the U.S. are bound tightly in space cooperation. 
Chapter 3: Theories of International Relations 
This chapter will examine main strains of international relations theory – 
neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism – with regard to cooperation, 
in order to facilitate analysis in the following chapter to answer the question of why 
space cooperation between Russia and the U.S. emerged and continued. It will begin 
with neorealism; then move onto neoliberal institutionalism, which examines the 
connection between institutions and cooperation; and then discuss constructivism, 
which emphasizes the importance of norms in international cooperation and includes 
the epistemic community literature, which focuses on the role of experts in policy 
dealing with cooperation. This chapter on theories of international relations will set the 
stage for the analysis of international relations theories and the phenomenon of U.S.-
Russian space cooperation to follow in the next chapter. 
Each theory tries to understand why states cooperate and how this process 
occurs, and their distinct assumptions about the way the world works inform their 
understandings. Neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists see the world as anarchic and 
state-based, but the former argue that states rarely cooperate and only when it suits their 
interests and are likely to back out of agreements. The latter, on the other hand, argue 
that in reality cooperation is far more likely than realists assume and that institutions 
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facilitate cooperation. Constructivists see the world as being governed by norms and 
rules. Even if the international system is anarchic, constructivists argue, actors within 
this anarchy still abide by various rules and norms. As Wendt writes, “Self-help and 
power politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy. Anarchy is what states 
make of it.”319 The content of an anarchic system depends on the rules and norms that 
predominantly operate in that system.  
Like many institutionalists, constructivists consider non-state actors to be 
important as well. This seems to be a strength as our world has moved away from the 
bipolar Cold War, and NGOs and IGOs show their importance. Constructivists are also 
similar to neoliberal institutionalists in that both see institutions as consisting of rules 
and norms. Krasner’s definition of international regime as “principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-
area” encapsulates this idea that institutions are themselves comprised of the principles, 
norms, rules, and accepted procedures believed in by the actors helping to create 
them.320 Constructivists and institutionalists recognize that norms themselves and 
institutions upholding certain norms can influence states to cooperate, which can help to 
explain why states cooperate even in situations where that would not seem to be the 
rational choice. The similarities and differences between the main types of international 
relations theory will be examined in more depth in the following sections. 
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Neorealism 
Neorealist literature relies on certain basic assumptions, which influence its 
examination of international cooperation. Neorealism assumes the world is anarchic and 
states are the actors in that world who operate in a rational, self-interested manner.321 
Jervis argues that cooperation is dangerous in the anarchic system, because states can 
quickly cease cooperation since there is no overarching institution that can enforce 
laws.322 But Jervis explains that states are more likely to cooperate when there is some 
type of security buffer, like the ability to defend oneself, for both states, which protects 
them in case the cooperative deal sours.323 Waltz argues that states all compete for 
power to increase security, since not competing reduces security if other states have 
hostile intentions; on the other hand, this competition can actually also reduce security, 
as other actors will likely respond.324 This is a phenomenon he calls the “security 
dilemma.”325 Even as states cooperate, he says, they are still ultimately focused on their 
own security, which dovetails with Jervis’s understanding of cooperation as requiring a 
security blanket.326 Because a state is constantly competing for power to increase its 
security, states in the realist framework are concerned mostly with relative, rather than 
absolute gains.327 Much of realist literature takes place in the context of the bipolar Cold 
War world and even as Waltz tries to make it relevant in the post-Cold War era, Wendt 
                                                 
321 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security 25, 1 (Summer 
2000): 5. 
322 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, 2 (January 1978): 167. 
323 Ibid., 172-173. 
324 Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” 8. 
325 Ibid. 
326 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18, 2 
(Fall 1993): 59. 
327 Robert Powell, “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory,” The American 
Political Science Review 85, 4 (December 1991): 1303. 
59 
points out the flaws in the assumption that states operate for the clear, self-interested, 
security-buffering reasons that neorealists claim, which breaks down Waltz’s argument 
in any time period.328 
Ultimately, the neorealist views cooperation as the means to a rational, self-
interested end, but a means that is fraught with uncertainty and fear of backstabbing, 
making it an option that does not hold up in the face of security issues between states. 
Realism, as Grieco says, holds a “pessimistic analysis of the prospects for international 
cooperation and of the capabilities of international institutions.”329 Realists think that 
institutions do not and cannot effectively constrain state actions in order to produce 
cooperation.330 Instead, institutions merely reflect the current power distribution and 
have minimal influence on state behavior.331 States, in choosing to cooperate, face the 
possibility that their cooperative partner may cheat or may gain more from the 
cooperation than the other will, realists argue, which makes states unlikely to 
cooperate.332 The guiding question for whether or not to cooperate, in realist theory, is 
“what do I want” and if the state finds that the answer requires cooperative action, only 
then might it consider cooperation, but only if the partner state will not gain more from 
the cooperation.333 
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Neoliberal Institutionalism 
Neoliberal institutionalists similarly understand the world in terms of anarchy, 
with states as the primary actors, but argue that “realism overemphasizes conflict and 
underestimates the capacities of international institutions to promote cooperation.”334 In 
essence, they argue that international institutions can (possibly) increase the ability for 
states to cooperate in an anarchic world.335 States can fear that other states will not 
uphold promises if they agree to cooperate, which can make cooperating unappealing, 
but sometimes states do cooperate, even though this might put them at a strategic 
disadvantage.336 States are primarily concerned with absolute gains, rather than relative 
gains, as they are unconcerned about the gains of others as long as they themselves feel 
secure.337 Snidal critiques realism by showing that even if states were concerned about 
relative gains more than absolute gains (although he argues, they are not), as realists 
claim, relative gains do not inhibit, nor in fact impact in any way, cooperation, 
particularly where more than two states are involved.338 States “use international 
institutions to further their own goals” and “design treaties and other legal arrangements 
to solve specific substantive and political problems.”339  
Institutionalists argue that states rationally choose and form institutions to 
facilitate cooperation based on different factors, like different preferred outcomes and 
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different problems they wish to solve.340 Marks et al. envision international institutions 
as arising from the involved states’ desire to cooperate, and then as parties discover 
shared understandings through involvement in contracts, this builds and reinforces 
commonalities and reduces fear of exploitation, which increases cooperation.341 States 
that have trouble cooperating actually benefit from engaging with institutions, because 
these institutions enforce agreements.342 Sometimes states may only cooperate when it 
is necessary in order to reach the mutual benefit, but the possibility of future 
cooperation being necessary and effective monitoring make states more willing to 
cooperate as well.343 This is the main point of the institutionalist argument; international 
institutions, even when used by rational, self-interested states in an anarchic system, can 
facilitate cooperation by offering a means of effective monitoring and a likely 
possibility of future cooperation. 
Some neoliberal institutionalist scholars look at larger groups’ interactions, 
especially with issues that incorporate many states in the institutional solution. Stavins 
examines climate change cooperation and explains that using institutions to ensure 
international cooperation is the best way to combat climate change, because they hold 
states more accountable and spread the cost of climate change reform.344 Kinne on the 
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other hand looks more closely at bilateral cooperation, arguing that states choose 
bilateral agreements more than multilateral in order to maximize the benefits of 
cooperation, they examine various outside political, economic, and geographic factors, 
and they consider third party ties that the other states have.345 This is particularly useful 
to the analysis of space cooperation because this is a case in which cooperation has been 
largely bilateral. Martin and Simmons also examine the ways in which institutions 
facilitate cooperation, arguing that institutions provide information to policy-makers, 
monitor behavior, resolve distributional conflict, substitute for domestic policy when it 
is ineffective, and encourage states’ norms to match with the group.346 Neoliberal 
institutionalists argue that states cooperate to fix shared problems and common goals, 
which suggests that there might be a bit of both conflict (as states seek to uphold their 
own interests) and cooperation (as states focus together on shared interests) in the 
formation of international institutions for the purpose of future cooperation on issues. 
Constructivism 
Constructivism moves even further away from the realist paradigm, questioning 
the assumption of state actors (positing that intergovernmental and nongovernmental 
organizations are actors as well) in global issues, questioning the anarchic world 
assumption, and recognizing the power of norms as a global force that influences actors, 
rather than seeing actors as primarily driven by self-interest. Even actors’ interests, 
Wendt argues, are actually constructed from their identities.347 Reus-Smit argues that 
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even though states construct institutions, which can facilitate cooperation, they do so 
within the context of the norms, rules, and identities that shape their worldview, so that 
norms themselves are institutions which actually shape states and other actors, which 
then shape institutions over time.348 Norms influence the way a state or other actor self-
identifies and the desire to uphold one’s self-identity is strong enough to make an actor 
choose an action that goes against other self-interests.349 Constructivists understand 
cooperation to be subject to the power of international norms and rules as well.350 States 
can create institutions to deal with cooperation issues, but international norms play a 
large role in the creation and operation of these cooperative institutions.351 The greatest 
influence on cooperative practices comes from culturally and historically rooted beliefs, 
rather than from strategic imperatives, Reus-Smit argues.352  
Johnston extends the constructivist understanding of the power of norms to 
directly argue that “attitudes toward social standing, status, and self-esteem” get 
connected to attitudes about cooperation, even without the actor realizing this process is 
occurring.353 He calls this “social influence” and emphasizes the relationship between 
an actor’s identity and relationship with other actors and its willingness to cooperate.354 
March and Olsen similarly emphasize the complexity between institutions and 
environments, pointing out that in issues of cooperation, they influence each other and 
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coevolve.355 Cooperation can in fact, March and Olsen argue, shape international 
identities.356 Interestingly, Johnston argues that “constructivists and institutionalists are 
both right”; constructivists, he says, rightfully argue that shared understandings of good 
behavior are necessary to facilitate cooperation, but he agrees that an institutional 
structure may also be necessary to measure whether actors are behaving consistently 
with the understanding.357 Being part of an institution that emphasizes cooperation will 
influence actors in that institution toward cooperating.358 Once actors become 
accustomed to cooperating as being a regular part of their identity and interactions with 
other actors, they are likely to continue to cooperate, out of habit of the cooperative 
practice.359 
Some constructivist literature addresses international relations cooperation in 
real world examples. Tsygankov suggests that changing norms on the state, society, and 
international levels affect foreign policy and cooperation of states, by examining 
Russian foreign policy under President Dmitri Medvedev.360 Cho and Kurtz examine 
the ASEAN Investment Regime and argue in favor of constructivism for understanding 
interstate cooperative regimes, as it offers the fullest understanding of the social 
structure that informs state action and international communities with shared goals and 
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norms.361 Finnemore and Sikkink recognize that even rational choices are influenced by 
norms, and actors know this, which explains why they sometimes try to influence norms 
through “strategic social construction.”362 Even cooperation as an action chosen by a 
state, then, is governed by norms. As Hurd argues, actors follow rules either because of 
fear of enforcement (coercion), the rule benefits the actor (self-interest), or the actor 
feels the rule is legitimate and should be obeyed (legitimacy).363 On a micro-level this is 
visible in the classroom setting, where all three of these may operate at once, as students 
recognize the teacher as an authority figure.364 Militaries function because members 
respect rules at least in part because of norms, which also inform the way they operate 
in conflict and peace.365 This troika governing rule-following is also applicable on a 
macro-level in the realm of international relations.366 
 Epistemic community theorists, like Haas, operate under a constructivist 
framework, highlighting the importance of norms and shared identity, and arguing that 
experts in a field influence policy (and by extension cooperation) by providing 
information at the national and transnational level.367 They argue that decision makers, 
when lacking this information, can make disastrous missteps that harm cooperation.368 
But epistemic communities can create and maintain social institutions, which support 
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cooperation with a given issue-area even when power relations have changed to make 
coordination unnecessary.369 Thus, even when conditions have changed to make 
cooperation unnecessary based on a rational viewpoint, if an epistemic community has 
shaped the norms in thinking about and dealing with a particular issue toward 
cooperating, then cooperation will tend to continue. Adler provides an example of 
epistemic community-led cooperation in the build-up to the U.S.-Soviet 1972 ABM 
treaty, which he argues came about not merely because of a change in balance of power 
and not due to any shared cultural or political goals, but because of American experts 
selected by the U.S. government.370 Agents (the experts), he says, “coordinate their 
behavior according to common practices that structure and give meaning to changing 
international reality” so that the same norms that create structure also influence agent 
behavior, while recognizing the importance of agent action in the shaping of policy.371 
In addition to epistemic community literature, intergovernmental networks 
(IGN) theory is also useful for this analysis. One can understand institutions like the 
United Nations and international treaties to be the highest level of formalization of 
international cooperation. Epistemic communities, on the other hand, are generally 
understood as networks operating independently of governments, through informal or 
non-state channels of communication. In between these two, and with some overlap 
among them, sits a layer of low-level continuing cooperation between governmental 
employees, including through informal agreements and memoranda of understanding, 
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which retains some level of autonomy in policymaking abilities, at least at this lower 
level.372 This low-level cooperation operates through sets of intergovernmental 
networks, also sometimes referred to in the literature as “transgovernmental networks,” 
or the actors in “transgovernmental relations,” which is not to be confused with 
“transnational relations,” as the latter more often refers to nongovernmental 
organizations.373 IGN theory recognizes that, as Slaughter writes, “networks of 
government officials – police investigators, financial regulators, even judges and 
legislators – increasingly exchange information and coordinate activity to combat global 
crime and address common problems on a global scale.”374 Each network has its own 
goals and methods of operating, but, ultimately, they allow government officials to have 
a broader reach, establish positive relationships between government officials from 
different states, build cooperation, increase information flow about best practices in the 
field, and spread technical knowledge and professional socialization.375  
In certain fields, like science, there is often overlap between IGNs, which are 
fundamentally public, and epistemic communities, which can be private, but also 
penetrate into the public and within these networks. Gual Soler shows in her analysis of 
two Latin American scientific cooperation networks (IGNs) that science in particular 
lends itself to the blurring between public and private; IGNs form “spaces” for 
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communities of knowledge-keepers, in this case the epistemic community of scientists, 
to interact.376 This is also the case with regard to outer space. It is difficult to draw a 
clear line between the epistemic community and the IGN in this thesis. It seems clear 
that members of the extensive epistemic community of scientists in this period were 
interacting in a similar manner as an IGN; whether or not every part of that interaction 
at all points throughout history was entirely public and thus under the domain of a true 
IGN is debatable. For this reason, the analysis of this paper will use the terminology of 
epistemic community literature, with the understanding that it includes in many cases 
the same networks as explained by IGN theory. In this particular case, epistemic 
community literature is broad enough to incorporate the important mechanisms of IGN 
theory. 
Conclusion 
The neoliberal institutionalist approach corrects some of the deficiencies of 
neorealism by showing that even in an anarchic system that faces states with security 
issues, states still can cooperate and often do so with the help of institutions. 
Constructivism builds upon the examination of institutions, but criticizes the way that 
both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism lack of a full examination of motive and 
the importance of norms in influencing actors’ engagement in cooperation, as they 
focus entirely on self-interest, without recognizing the role of norms in bargaining for 
these interests.377 When two actors meet to negotiate, they do not do so in a vacuum, but 
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come to the table having been socialized to conduct encounters in a particular way and 
develop rules guiding their future interactions, even while trying to negotiate to support 
the interests of each.378 Constructivists also critique neoliberal institutionalists and 
realists for not effectively explaining times when states do not act self-interestedly. 
Epistemic community literature operates as a sub-set of constructivism, focusing on 
transnational networks of policy experts who facilitate international cooperation. 
Understanding these approaches to cooperation and weighing the merits of each is 
important for recognizing the reasons for cooperation as well as the best ways to shape 
policy to support cooperation.  
 In understanding the transition from competition to cooperation – i.e. emergence 
of cooperation – the three theories previously discussed differ rather significantly. 
According to a neorealist framework, cooperation can only arise out of a rational 
decision prompted by self-interest by two states, who come together and loosely agree 
to cooperate, at least until one decides that cooperation no longer serves him. This 
cooperation is unlikely to occur, as states are most concerned about relative gains over 
each other, unless both states think they are gaining more than the other (although this 
would clearly be impossible in reality and so would likely result in nothing more than 
very short-term cooperation that ends once it becomes clear who gained more) or when 
states gain about equally. If there is little fear of defection or only small gains to be had, 
then states will likely have an easier time agreeing to cooperate. Given the right 
circumstances, like an outside threat to the security of two states, two states may come 
to an agreement to cooperate, with reservations.  
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Neoliberal institutionalists similarly see the emergence of cooperation as an 
effect of a rational choice by states, prompted by self-interest in an anarchic world. 
These states create institutions rationally to achieve the preferred outcome by holding 
the other state(s) to the deal. It seems likely, then, in the still security-focused anarchic 
world, that states would hesitate before cooperating, but would ultimately be more 
likely to cooperate in this world than in the neorealists’, as they would feel more 
confident that their security would be protected by the framework of the institution. It 
also suggests that to have this level of confidence in the institution, states would create 
and use institutions with monitoring and verification functions and shared expectations 
about current and future cooperation. Thus, based on a neoliberal institutionalist 
framework, these institutions will either precede cooperation or be created around the 
same time as the emergence of cooperation and sustain it.  
Constructivism’s emergence of cooperation comes from identities of actors 
along with norms and rules that influence the creation of institutions and also change 
those institutions over time. Cooperation is likely to emerge in a constructivist world if 
the actors involved have a self-identity (reflecting attitudes about social status and self-
esteem) that encourages cooperative action. The creation of cooperation, which can 
occur through an institutional structure, relies on a shared understanding of proper 
behavior in a partnership, and the fact that an actor is part of an institution that 
emphasizes cooperation will likely influence that actor to increasingly cooperate. 
 With regard to maintenance of cooperation, similar ideas resonate. If the 
prospect of agreeing to cooperate is minimal in the neorealist system, the likelihood of 
maintaining that cooperation is even less. At the slightest fear of being backstabbed, a 
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state would rationally decide to end an agreement, and because states act rationally to 
preserve and increase their power and security in a neorealist world, states would likely 
be unable to maintain any sort of cooperation for long. States only maintain cooperation 
as it suits them in the fight to make the largest relative gains. The neoliberal 
institutionalist framework suggests states will be likely to maintain cooperation when 
using institutions to facilitate cooperation, because institutions have consequences that 
dissuade actors from backing out of agreements and so states involved in cooperation in 
outer space for example would be less likely to backstab if they had an institution in 
place to protect themselves (and the other party). Constructivists argue that actors are 
likely to continue cooperating once they are accustomed to it as a normal part of their 
identity and interactions with other actors. Thus, as with emergence, maintenance of 
cooperation seems more likely under constructivism than neoliberal institutionalism, but 
more likely under neoliberal institutionalism than under neorealism. 
In the realm of outer space, cooperation has come in the form of formal 
cooperation through institutions and informal cooperation within an epistemic 
community. Two questions must be answered to determine the reason for U.S.-Russian 
space cooperation: 1. What explains the transition from competition to cooperation? 
And 2. What explains the maintenance of cooperation, particularly amidst a poor 
relationship in earth-bound foreign policy dealings? The theories of international 
relations provided here help to sort through these questions. This chapter does not seek 
to declare one of these theories to be true or false. Instead, it provides a set of tools in 
the form of international relations theories with which to analyze this case and 
determine the causes of cooperation emergence and maintenance. Thus, some 
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conclusions will be reached in the overall thesis regarding the relative utility of these 
theories in this case study, but this chapter does not provide a full judgement on that 
matter so as not to be over-hasty in its conclusions.  The relevant ideas and findings 
from the theories will be of use in the following analysis chapter in order to understand 
the case of U.S.-Russian space cooperation. 
Chapter 4: Analysis of the Causes of Cooperation in Outer Space 
This chapter highlights the critical junctures of movement between competition 
and cooperation as well as instances of prolonged cooperation and examines the causes 
of these shifts with the assistance of theories of international relations. Historical 
institutionalism has created “critical juncture theory,” which posits that there are often 
long periods of institutional stability that are suddenly punctuated by phases of change, 
which are called critical junctures.379 Identifying critical junctures can help to explain 
major changes in institutions and policies over time.380 Critical juncture theory is useful 
in this chapter for recognizing important historical events that mark critical turning 
points in U.S.-Russian space cooperation.  
This chapter identifies seven critical junctures: the early involvement of the 
scientific community; the creation of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space; the creation of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 
aka the Outer Space Treaty; the end of the Space Race and development of the Apollo-
Soyuz project; the creation of the Strategic Defense Initiative; Gorbachev’s leadership 
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and the end of the Cold War; and the development of the International Space Station. 
The chapter is subdivided by these critical junctures in order to examine the reasons for 
emergence or breakdown of cooperation at these critical junctures, using the lessons 
from the previous chapter regarding constructivist, neoliberal institutionalist, and 
neorealist frameworks. The chapter ends with a summary of findings in its conclusion. 
The governments’ perceptions of status and military threats and linking 
technological capability symbolically to ideological beliefs hindered cooperation and 
even turned away from cooperation toward competition at times, while the scientific 
community’s beliefs about the proper purpose of activity in space, government leaders’ 
agreement with these beliefs, early codification of rules of space practice, and respect 
for outer space treaty law helped to turn toward cooperation. This analysis finds that 
although some periods of upper-level cooperation have been fleeting and matched the 
general spirit of U.S.-Russian relations, as a neorealist might expect, many periods of 
cooperation have outlasted cooperative U.S.-Russian relations in general, and are better 
explained through constructivism and neoliberal institutionalism. Perhaps most 
significantly, this analysis finds that low-level cooperation between the scientific 
communities in the US and USSR/Russia has continued, without any substantial 
interruptions, from the earliest days of space activity into the present day.  
Ultimately, this analysis shows that emergence of space cooperation was due to 
a determined epistemic community that supported and advocated for the norm of 
recognizing outer space as a peaceful, cooperative, scientific environment, within their 
own governments and through informal cooperation, along with the creation of formal 
institutions that uphold this norm. Maintenance of low-level space cooperation, which 
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has been quite consistent since its early emergence, has also been due to support from 
the scientific community and formal institutions. Maintenance of high-level space 
cooperation, which has been less consistent over time, but has in recent decades become 
quite stable and lasting, has also been supported by the efforts of the scientific 
community and formal institutions. Additionally, this high-level cooperation required 
the entrenchment of the space cooperation norm in the upper-government level, which 
varied over time due to the process of socialization, habit-formation, geopolitical 
interests, and status considerations. 
The Scientific Community 
As discussed in chapter two, the USSR and US entered the era of space 
development in an environment of competition following World War II that manifested 
in the Cold War. This initial environment of rivalry continued with the space race, 
where competition stemming from highly military-focused governments’ desire for 
perceived dominance in outer space muffled the international scientific community’s 
hopes for efficient technological advancement through collaboration. Kennedy’s 1961 
speech declaring American commitment to land a man on the moon before the USSR 
and connecting this technological competition to a deeper ideological fight between 
“freedom and tyranny” shows the depth of the animosity between the states and the 
space race as an extension of this animosity.381 This relationship might seem at first 
glance to fit within a realist understanding of the world, as though both states fought for 
power in an anarchic system, with space seeming untouched at this point by the 
institutions to which other theories give credence. But that oversimplifies the situation 
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between the two countries and mischaracterizes the reality of the period. In fact, even as 
Sputnik was launched in a competitive mood, the International Geophysical Year was 
occurring with UN sponsorship, showing the depth of cooperation in which the 
scientific community believed.382 The Antarctica agreement, which became a model for 
the Outer Space Treaty, and which occurred in the midst of the Cold War through the 
UN, also showed the cooperation between scientists in the international community that 
often seems to be overlooked in discussions of the space race.383 
The space race itself, which did involve a high level of competition within the 
American and Soviet governments, fits better within a constructivist and neoliberal 
institutionalist examination, as both states held onto their own beliefs about what the 
best system was; Kennedy’s appeal to the public with words like “freedom and tyranny” 
show that the public was also moved by an appeal to their values. The space race 
provided an outlet for governments to display the superiority of their ideologies, 
symbolized by technological advancements and incredible feats in space.384 The 
competition escalated, just as a realist might expect, as each state put more resources 
toward launching the first satellite, then the first man in space, and so on until the moon 
landing. But proving the dominance not only of military might but of ideology remained 
an important part of the equation in the space race, something for which realism does 
not account and for which instead we must turn to constructivism, which points to the 
importance of values and beliefs in shaping one’s actions.385 The dominance of 
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American values or Soviet values lay in the ability of their technologies to prove 
superior and although the Outer Space Treaty prohibited claiming ownership over the 
moon, the choice by NASA to hoist an American flag on the moon was a display of 
American superiority nonetheless.386  
Combining a constructivist understanding of the function of epistemic 
communities with neoliberal institutionalism helps to understand how this ideological 
competition taking place between two societies could occur amidst the beginnings of 
cooperation in space including Kennedy’s 1963 call for space cooperation in his address 
to the UN General Assembly, the signing of the “The Treaty on Principles Governing 
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies,” and ongoing cooperative project discussions between 
Soviet and American scientists. Even as the Cold War continued, cooperation still 
emerged and sustained, primarily through institutional tools and norms surrounding the 
scientific nature of space activities.  
The international scientific community saw space as a scientific environment, 
rather than a battlefield, which started to become codified in formal institutions early 
on, even while the space race continued. This dichotomy of military and scientific 
pressures helps to explain the disjointed actions and words that major government 
leaders produced which sometimes seemed to favor cooperation or competition even as 
other actions and words suggested the opposite. Eisenhower and his Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles’s approach seemed to mix the cooperative technological goals of the 
scientific community with the security fears and dominance goals of the military.387 The 
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UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space came about with their support in 
1959, in part as an attempt to safeguard American scientific freedoms in space, much 
like scientists hoped would be the case for scientific endeavors of all countries; it comes 
as no surprise that the Antarctic Treaty, setting aside Antarctica as a scientific preserve, 
came about in this same year.388 Eisenhower himself compared the two in a 1960 
address to the UN.389  
The idea of seeing outer space as more similar to Antarctica than an extension of 
a battlefield was clearly rooted in the discussions within the international scientific 
community, an epistemic community which influenced top leadership to at least 
recognize the scientific side of outer space and not just the military. Even while noting 
the technical difficulties of cooperation in space, NASA scientists compared scientific 
ventures in space to those in Antarctica.390 Frutkin, Blagonravov, and other American 
and Soviet scientific leaders established rapport with each other in an effort to find 
common projects through which to cooperate and then communicated these ideas to 
their governments.391 The upper-level government bureaucracies were ultimately where 
science and military norms met and sometimes clashed in the process of determining 
what sort of frontier space would be. Even in cases of renewed competition, however, 
the norms regarding space as a scientific realm that scientists supported still had an 
impact in keeping space from turning into a warzone. 
                                                 
388 Ibid. 
389 Ezell and Ezell, The Partnership, kindle loc. 764. 
390 Ibid., 1201-1208. 
391 Ibid., 758. 
78 
UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
The formal institutions codifying these scientific and cooperative ideas were the 
next step in the rather gradual shift from competition to cooperation, beginning with the 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Neoliberal institutionalism teaches 
that institutions come about from a desire to cooperate, but can then help to reinforce 
shared understandings of issues through the creation of shared contracts, and reduce 
fear of exploitation.392 The time and effort states take to join together and create these 
institutions is an indicator of the trust they place in the institutions’ abilities to facilitate 
cooperation and their effectiveness.393 The 1959 creation of the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was an important formal institutionalization of the idea of 
outer space as a place for peaceful, scientific uses, but still recognized that outer space 
could be seen as a security issue in need of an institution ensuring its uses are peaceful. 
In fact, even today this committee is one of the largest in the UNGA, highlighting the 
important role of institutions in issues of outer space.394  
Determining a critical juncture in the transition from competition to cooperation 
thus becomes difficult in examining the era of the space race. Although both countries 
continued to attempt to beat the other to various milestones, in the background, 
scientists kept lines of communication open in order to discuss collaborative 
possibilities and institutions like the UNCOPUOS and the Outer Space Treaty came 
about, codifying their visions of space as a scientific, peaceful environment for the use 
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of scientists from all nations.395 Perhaps the creation of the UNCOPUOS as an 
institution upholding these scientific norms in the context of outer space can be 
understood as a major critical juncture, because it led to the creation of other important, 
cooperation-upholding institutions like the Outer Space Treaty, which together 
facilitated the continuation of cooperation over time, even during periods of renewed 
tension in U.S.-Russian relations. 
One might argue that the Cuban Missile Crisis itself was a turning point from 
competition to cooperation. It did seem to at least make the idea of cooperation more 
palatable for the top leaders in each government. The Cuban Missile Crisis was a wake-
up call of the very real possibility of nuclear disaster and the necessity of improved 
diplomacy in staving off future crisis. Kennedy’s call to the Soviet Union for help, 
against the advice of his hawkish generals, and Khrushchev’s response to his foreign 
minister, “Yes, help. We now have a common cause, to save the world from those 
pushing us toward war,” were clear indicators that both leaders were ready for a less 
dangerous, negative relationship.396 The slight shift away from such heated relations is 
understandable from the measurement of each side’s interests – sharing space 
technology would split the costs and allying in space might provide some common 
ground on which to connect, opening up lines of communication and lessening chances 
of future disaster. But in reality, while this was an important event in shaping 
government actions, to call the Cuban Missile Crisis the immediate turning point toward 
cooperation would oversimplify the relationship between foreign policy and space 
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technology and overlook the independence of the scientific community. Scientists on 
both sides had been taking part in discussions about cooperative scientific ventures even 
before Sputnik made its first orbit.397 They sought to model outer space presence on the 
polar regions, preserving it as a place for technological research rather than military 
gain.  
After the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy’s 1963 speech to the UN emphasized 
scientific research and the benefits of a cooperative approach between the US and 
USSR.398 This speech showed a transition in his own thinking toward cooperation from 
his 1961 declaration of plans to win the race to the moon, which seemed to stem from 
increased communication with his own scientific community along with a recognition 
of the serious consequences that could arise from too great a clash.399 Constructivism 
helps to explain this shift, as an actor’s identity and beliefs shape its worldview and thus 
the actions it decides to take.400 Kennedy was a leader who was particularly open to 
ideas, which fits with his increased acceptance of the cooperation proposed by 
scientists, and loathe to permit escalation in conflict, resulting in his refusal to send in 
troops to East Berlin or Laos.401 His openness to the ideas about scientific and peaceful 
uses of outer space supported by his NASA scientists helped to change the way he 
himself understood the realm of outer space through the process of socialization, in 
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which an actor is inducted into the norms and rules of a given community.402 This 
speech is also an important marker of the importance Americans placed upon the UN, 
seeing it as an effective stage upon which to come to meaningful agreements. In June 
1960, Kennedy told the US Senate in his “A Time of Decision” speech that he sought to 
strengthen the United Nations and give it a greater role in solving international 
conflicts.403  
Although the Soviet response to this transition to a more cooperative mindset 
seemed mixed, it still fits within a constructivist framework as it was linked to attitudes 
toward status.404 Initially, they did not answer Kennedy’s proposition in the UNGA at 
all, ignoring Kennedy’s proposal and not covering it in the media. Interestingly, the 
1973 Moscow-published book President Kennedy’s 1036 Days, by Anatolii Gromyko, 
examining the Kennedy presidency discusses Kennedy’s June 10, 1963 address at 
American University, which makes the case that there is no rational reason to have total 
war when great powers can destroy each other’s forces with a few nuclear weapons; the 
book argues that Kennedy’s speech showed his departure from traditional, cold-war, 
American political dogma toward a reexamination of attitudes toward the USSR and a 
less hateful, hardline stance.405 It then covers the U.S. government’s agreement “in the 
summer of 1963 to the Soviet Union’s proposal to enter into negotiations for a ban on 
nuclear tests,” based on Kennedy’s initiative. It does not, however, discuss Kennedy’s 
UNGA speech, and skips forward to the October 17th UNGA resolution agreed upon by 
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the US and USSR to refrain from putting nuclear weapons in outer space.406 While this 
omission seems somewhat puzzling – after all, it is just a part of the general move 
toward outer space cooperation taking place in the upper echelons of government in 
1963 – examining what Gromyko did include helps to illuminate a possible explanation. 
Gromyko includes only agreements which the Soviet Union proposed or which both 
parties came to on seemingly equal footing, at least according to his portrayal. Including 
a speech in which Kennedy was the explicit proposer of a cooperative peace plan would 
have gone against Soviet propaganda, (which even into 1973 still promulgated the 
image of the USSR as the stronger, smarter figure who recognized the inevitability of 
the capitalist America’s collapse into socialism and merely wished to extend an olive 
branch toward cooperation, while keeping up a shield in case America, portrayed as a 
weaker, irrational child of a state, who could not sense its own inevitable surrender to 
socialism, attempted to harm the world using nuclear weapons). Instead, Moscow 
emphasized its own proposals for peace and portrayed Kennedy as a leader who was 
coming to his senses, but was still burdened by hawkish advisors who were at fault for 
hampering cooperation.407  
The Kremlin’s hiding of Kennedy’s cooperation proposal from its own people 
was likely part of its strategy to seem like the dominant player who sets the rules of the 
game and tied directly to its perception of its own status in relation to the United States. 
The open discussion of Kennedy’s speeches that lacked proposals suggests that the 
Soviets may have been open to an agreement with Kennedy in the future as long as it 
did not appear to have begun on American terms. This focus on perceptions of power 




and status fits exactly with constructivism and shows why it was difficult to come to a 
cooperative agreement on a large-scale government level, even though scientists had 
already been collaborating and discussing on a smaller-scale for years.408 The American 
and Soviet governments’ desire to prove their respective ideologies superior operated in 
conjunction with their fear of seeming like the lower-status player and thus hampered 
their ability to easily cooperate.409 Scientists, as they did not represent an entire 
ideology of capitalism or socialism, did not feel the weight of this status competition, 
and instead operated as their own epistemic community, sharing scientific norms across 
national boundaries, and thus connecting them more easily internationally in general.410  
The Kremlin’s use of formal institutions (namely UN agreements) to work with 
the U.S. showed that the USSR agreed with the U.S. with regard to the effectiveness of 
formal institutions in bolstering the likelihood of each party upholding their side of the 
agreements. The USSR chose to use methods linked with formal institutions in order to 
work toward cooperation following the Cuban Missile Crisis, as with its continued 
involvement in the UNCOPUOS, while picking and choosing when to open the door to 
cooperation in order to preserve its image as a higher status player. At the same time, it 
accused the U.S. of doing the same thing, demanding that global issues be fixed on 
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American terms – “a clear departure from the spirit of Kennedy’s realistic 
statements.”411  
Kennedy’s UNGA speech, highlighting that America was reaching out to the 
Soviet Union in the formal institutional setting that both countries recognized as 
meaningful and powerful in providing a forum for cooperation, and the Soviet Union’s 
rejection of this narrative, in favor of one that highlighted its own role as the dominant 
player extending an olive branch to the less enlightened and less powerful U.S., show 
the importance of perceptions of status in determining whether cooperation would take 
place. Neither state wished to seem the less proactive, weaker player, slowing 
cooperative goals that the scientific community insistently championed and which they 
were gradually institutionalizing and would come to be internalized by each state in the 
future.  
The Outer Space Treaty 
Another critical juncture toward cooperation in outer space came in the 1967 
“Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies” (aka. The Outer Space 
Treaty), which set the principles governing the law of outer space.412 Unlike other types 
of international law which often find roots in custom, the lack of custom regarding 
operations in outer space meant that treaties set the standard for outer space law.413 The 
creation of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty was rooted in the scientific community’s push 
for treating both Antarctica and outer space as scientific research environments rather 
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than military zones, illustrating the power of an epistemic community in setting 
norms.414 Eisenhower had agreed with this categorization, suggesting in a 1960 speech 
to the UN General Assembly that the principles of the Antarctic Treaty apply to outer 
space.415  
The U.S. proposed banning the use of outer space for military purposes as early 
as 1959, arguing that outer space was a distinctly separate issue from general 
disarmament, while Soviet proposals beginning of in 1960 for ensuring peaceful uses of 
outer space linked it to other disarmament issues.416 This difference in proposals makes 
sense, given that the U.S. did not want to rid itself of foreign bases where it stationed 
short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles and the USSR did not want to close off 
the possibility of gaining its own military advantage in space without assurance that the 
U.S. would be disarming and reducing the threat of missile attack on the USSR.417 
Although this disagreement about disarmament seemed to put the two states at an 
impasse, the fact that even in 1959 at least through 1962 (when the proposals tapered 
off) both governments were submitting proposals to make space a non-military 
environment shows that the scientific community’s framing of outer space as a 
scientific arena was at least in part accepted in governments; the speech by Eisenhower 
and later Outer Space Treaty showed that the Antarctic model supported by the 
scientific community did help to shape the way Soviet and American leaders 
approached the outer space issue. 
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The Outer Space Treaty set the standards for uses of outer space, ensuring they 
be peaceful, and thus setting the stage for a more cooperative focus. These 
institutionalized standards created a path dependency, which institutionalism explains is 
a sort of stable pattern, in this case regarding peaceful uses of outer space, informing the 
policies regarding outer space to follow.418 This treaty came about in part due to the 
beliefs of the scientific community, the Antarctic model, and government acceptance of 
these ideas (along with security fears) as discussed above.  
The treaty also came about due to a unique tendency in outer space issues to 
codify laws before activities went too far against what governments wanted and the 
beliefs of governments that international law was an effective way to govern outer 
space.419 The codification of outer space law before much establishment of custom in 
dealing with outer space resulted from a few factors. In part, it was due to the small 
number of states taking part in outer space activities, which helped to reach consensus 
on certain issues relatively quickly.420 The nature of outer space activity problems, in 
that they tend to be of a technical nature and can require technical cooperation, also 
helped to push for the creation of detailed rules regarding rights and obligations of 
states, while custom would be too general and broad in obligations.421 Legal regulations 
also came about more quickly than with other areas of international law because states 
were anticipating problems that would arise from the practice of states in exploration 
and use of outer space.422 Custom still played some role in creating space law, as 
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customary rules of general international law and customs preceding the 1967 Outer 
Space Treaty like free use of outer space by states with the capability, sovereignty not 
extending to space, no national appropriation of space, and states retaining jurisdiction 
over their own craft in space became codified later in treaty law.423 Recognizing the 
importance of customs and norms that became codified and were followed by states 
afterward shows the importance of constructivism and neoliberal institutionalism in 
analyzing U.S.-Russian outer space relations. 
End of the Space Race and Fruition of the Apollo-Soyuz 
Although the space race era saw little cooperation in practice, with a majority of 
cooperation taking place in unpublicized international scientific communities, the post-
moon landing period saw in both the US and the USSR an increase in receptivity of 
government officials to leading scientists’ proposals for cooperation. This transition was 
another critical juncture in shifting toward greater cooperation. After the Apollo 11, the 
U.S. felt it had met Kennedy’s 1961 goal; the Soviet Union did not have a further goal 
in space and had by this point turned more attention toward improving the poor 
economic conditions with which Khrushchev left the country.424 The finishing of the 
space race ended the perceived need for either state to show its high status through 
beating the other at making technological advancements in space and other issues 
(economics, especially) took over the primary focus in the government. This amounted 
to a lowering of stakes in the space game, as constructivism explains, because actions in 
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space were no longer tied to the perceived status of the players, and so each felt more 
free to cooperate without it negatively impacting their self-esteem.425 It opened Soviet 
officials to Keldysh’s ideas for developing compatible equipment and procedures with 
the U.S. that he had been working on with Paine.426 It led to Nixon’s public support for 
space cooperation and call for technical negotiations between the US and USSR.427 The 
public no longer saw spaceflight as necessary for proving dominance in the Cold War; 
some thought scientific exploration without the competitive undertones should be the 
next step, while others thought human spaceflight had served its purpose and money 
should not be wasted on more outer space ventures.428 Once there was no longer a 
perceived race in which status depended on beating the other to a particular benchmark, 
it became easier for government officials concerned with security to let the scientific 
community take more control over the activities in space and to support these scientific 
ventures with high-level agreements about cooperative or peaceful activities in space.  
This cooperation resulted in the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, which took place in 
1975, but had its roots in the communications between the scientific community in the 
U.S. and USSR decades earlier. Paine’s Deputy Administrator George Low began 
official negotiations for a joint program in 1970 and continued to negotiate until 
reaching an agreement, which Premier Kosygin and President Nixon signed as part of 
the 1972 SALT accords.429 When the last lunar mission finished in 1972, the leftover 
Apollo rockets and craft went toward Skylab – meant for scientific research, 
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symbolizing the scientific focus of space activity in the post-space race era – and the 
Apollo-Soyuz mission – marking the end of competition and beginning of meaningful, 
operationalized cooperation in space.430 The Apollo-Soyuz was the result of decades of 
support from the scientific community for a more collaborative view of space activity, 
the ending of status-linked competitive activities due to a lack of clear goals for space 
activity beyond the lunar landing set by governments and a need to focus on economics 
and other earthly issues, and the formal institutionalization of norms of space practice 
through treaty law. It is the clear marker of cooperation in the history of space activities 
between the Soviet Union and U.S. 
SDI Competition and Low-Level Scientific Cooperation 
A critical turning point away from cooperation, marking the swing of the 
pendulum back in the direction of competition on the macro/government level, was 
Ronald Reagan’s SDI. Military satellite programs on both sides quietly advanced in the 
shadow cast by the publicized Apollo-Soyuz mission and continued to advance 
alongside the increase in ICBM stocks.431 Carter and Brezhnev’s SALT II accord did 
little to quell rising fears that the other side might create effective ICBM defense 
systems, which would end the promise of mutually assured destruction and thus 
destabilize the security system between the two.432 The USSR feared the technological 
advancements of US weaponry and the US feared the size of the Soviet arsenal.433 The 
military technological advancements and ending of the cooperative space mission 
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helped to create an environment of fear and led to a crumbling of the spirit of 
cooperation in space.  
Constructivism explains that perceptions about an actor’s social standing, 
environment, and identity inform the way it will act.434 This environment of fear 
resulted from the public perception on the side of the U.S. that the larger number of 
Soviet weapons was a greater threat than technological advancements, and the Soviet 
perception that America’s technological advancements were a stronger, greater threat 
than their own larger arsenal. The perceptions of what makes a greater threat and a 
worry about being the lesser-player in the game of missiles, which had been born in the 
period since the ending of the space game, drove both states to take a more defensive 
and less trusting stance. The 1979 falling of Skylab, a symbol of scientific, peaceful 
uses of outer space for which the U.S. was unwilling to fund a restoration project, was a 
fitting harbinger for the era to come.435 
Reagan’s platform noted the inequality in disarmament, which had affected the 
American arsenal more than the Soviet arsenal, and popular opinion once again felt 
more fear for the Soviet space program’s possible technology than awe at the American 
and Soviet cooperation.436 In the Soviet Union worries about instability hung in the air 
in Brezhnev’s period of economic stagnation followed by his death in 1982 and fears 
about Reagan moving away from the détente propelled the USSR to become more 
defensive as well.437 Reagan’s SDI program clearly cut the cooperative tie between the 
                                                 
434 Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” 499-500.; Steele, “Ontological 
Security and the Power of Self-Identity,” 524-529. 
435 Pahl, Space Warfare and Strategic Defense, 16. 
436 Ibid., 41-44, 6. 
437 Ibid., 44.; Hughes-Wilson, A Brief History of The Cold War, 300. 
91 
countries and met the perceived need for bolstered security that the American public 
felt. The Soviet Union’s stagnation only continued in the turnover of Soviet leaders, 
from Brezhnev, to Andropov, and then to Chernenko.438 Although they continued to run 
military technology improvement programs, lack of a clear mission from the upper tiers 
of power coupled with inefficiencies in the overly large bureaucracy contributed to a lag 
in Soviet technology. In some ways, this period in the early to mid-1980s was an echo 
of the space race, albeit with a much less involved Soviet player that was struggling 
with its own domestic economic problems. Once again, the goal to have greater status 
helped to propel the US to set the terms of disarmament and outer space defense 
programs, and beliefs about ideological differences also played an important role, as the 
US sought to defeat the “evil empire” by neutralizing its security threat through SDI.439 
A realist might argue that the heightened American and Soviet tensions were in 
this case entirely rational, as the USSR had more missiles than the US and America’s 
technological advancements, thus making it prudent for each side to offset the perceived 
advantages of the other. The SDI era does seem to almost fit within the predictions of a 
realist framework, as it was focused on the Soviet threat. But realism fails to explain 
why Reagan would have bothered to uphold the Outer Space Treaty, which clearly 
limited his policy options – a seemingly irrational move. The US has emphasized the 
Outer Space Treaty’s “peaceful uses of outer space” as meaning “nonaggressive;” 
Reagan’s SDI program limited itself within the confines of nonaggression in order to 
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avoid violating this treaty.440 If Mearsheimer’s argument that institutions are weak and 
merely reflect current power distributions were true, it seems unlikely that Reagan 
would have limited his own strategic military options in order to uphold this formal 
institution.441  
Additionally, realism fails to explain the cooperation that did occur in this 
period. The security-focused rivalry suggested by SDI and the personalities and policy 
priorities of Reagan and his Soviet premier counterparts muted open cooperation like 
that of the Apollo-Soyuz mission. Nevertheless, there remained lower-level cooperation 
between scientists and technical experts. Roald Sagdeev, director of the Space Research 
Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences from 1973 to 1988 and science advisor to 
Gorbachev writes that certain low-profile cooperative ventures were approved by the 
Kremlin and White House during the 1980s including coordinated use of U.S.-
Canadian-French SARSAT and Soviet COSPAS satellites for search and rescue efforts 
for ships and airplanes in distress and NASA-Soviet space biology and medicine 
experiments continued.442 Soviet academicians Oleg Gazenko and Anatoly Grigoriev 
and NASA scientist Arnauld Nicogossian led a cooperative program in which U.S. 
medical devices were used in primate experiments on the 1983 Cosmos 1514 
mission.443 This low-level scientific cooperation, reminiscent of the cooperative talks 
spearheaded by Blagonravov, Frutkin, and other scientists in the early days of the space 
race, continued throughout a difficult and tense period in US-Soviet relations. Soviet 
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and American scientists also continued meeting at the Committee on Space Research, 
established in 1958, and through the International Astronautical Federation.444 These 
discussions led to a Soviet-American cooperative project in 1981 to explore Halley’s 
Comet along with the European Space Agency.445 Various private groups like the 
Planetary Society, created by Carl Sagan, NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory Director 
Bruce Murray, and physicist Louis Friedman and the Association of Space Explorers, 
consisting of astronauts and cosmonauts served as forums for collaborative scientific 
discussion and facilitated the continuation of communication and cooperative 
projects.446 Later, these cooperative ventures served as the example for cooperation 
between Russian space station Mir and the U.S. shuttle programs and the ISS.447 
Realism would predict that the security threat posed by the enemy in this period 
of heightened tension would eliminate cooperation even on these lower levels. 
Cooperation and technology sharing poses a threat as it opens your operations to 
another actor’s eyes – in this case doubly threatening given the rivalrous nature of the 
partners’ relationship in general. And yet, the cooperation continued. Constructivism 
better explains this phenomenon, as it shows how cooperation can persist out of habit, 
once the norm of cooperation on a particular issue – outer space activities, in this case – 
becomes entrenched into the actor’s identity and beliefs.448 The scientific community, 
the epistemic community of experts in this case, supported the norm of cooperation and 
advocated for it in the government long enough for the countries to become socialized 
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into thinking about scientific cooperation in these terms, as constructivism explains.449 
Thus, the scientific community’s low-level cooperation was exempted from the tension 
and security threats of the SDI era. 
Gorbachev and the End of the Cold War 
The tides turned back toward a more openly cooperative relationship with 
Gorbachev’s ascent to power.  Gorbachev’s own background as an agricultural 
specialist favored economic focus over military and this prioritization manifested itself 
in perestroika and glasnost.450 The creation of the Mir (“peace”) space station in 1986 
seemed to symbolize this value in the outer space realm. The Cold War ended on a 
cooperative note, signaled through Gorbachev’s statement to Bush ensuring the USSR 
would not start a new war with the US and wishing for cooperation between the two.451 
The collapse of the Soviet Union helped both players to feel as though they could start 
anew without the ideological clash that plagued earlier relations; this turning of a new 
leaf helped the governments see the space relationship as less rivalrous, which was 
displayed through the scaling back and transformation of the SDI program and the 
increase in scientific space program expenses.452 The agreement between Yeltsin and 
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Bush to initiate cooperative manned space programs cemented that the nature of the 
space relationship would include cooperation.453  
Although, naturally, the military continued satellite programs geared toward 
military support (reconnaissance, communication, etc.), it is important to recognize that 
these programs have never included military weapons capable of striking an enemy. 
Even in the SDI era, which might be considered the closest the world has come to a 
truly militarized, strike-capability satellite technology, rather than just support systems, 
the system was still unable to strike the enemy – only the enemy’s weapon that had just 
been fired.454 Reagan’s inclusion of the word “defense” in the program title likewise 
shows America’s reluctance to label this capability as offensive in any way, helping 
them to remain within the guidelines of the Outer Space Treaty. Being a part of an 
institution, constructivism shows, will shape actor’s beliefs and values toward 
alignment with the beliefs and values supported by the institution.455 Once the actor 
becomes used to acting in accordance with that institution’s standards, it will tend to 
continue to do so in the future out of habit, as a constructivist lens explains.456 The 
emphasis on SDI as being a “defensive” program shows the extent to which the norm 
declaring outer space to be for peace that the Outer Space Treaty codified and to which 
the U.S. adhered, had become engrained in the American government. Although the 
media dubbed the program “Star Wars,” which implies a set of offensive weaponry on 
both sides in space (like the film series), the program itself was still focused on defense 
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rather than offense, showing the value a more hawkish administration (in comparison to 
its predecessor) placed on upholding the tenets of the Outer Space Treaty.  
The SDI program did not go into effect in space, as the perceived need for the 
defense program disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union.457 Since then, 
military involvement in space has been limited to a support capacity on both sides or 
posturing without actual attack, supporting the norm of space as a peaceful, scientific 
realm. The lessons learned from the SDI program went toward the improvement of anti-
satellite systems, which can shoot down satellites from a terrestrial position (but as of 
the present have not been used on enemy satellites), as well as proximity-sensing 
capability for satellites so that they can either disrupt enemy operations without 
damaging enemy property or sense interference and avoid compromising operations.458 
These systems help states to show off technological prowess and support status claims 
without violating the peaceful use of space. This shows the endurance of the norm of 
space being a scientific, peaceful realm supported by scientists as early as the 1950s and 
the strength of formal institutions in governing space operations. Norms, the standards 
of behavior that are expected of a group, tell actors which practices are unacceptable 
(they do not meet the norm) and shape an actor’s identity to the extent that the actor 
thinks in terms of those norms, often subconsciously, in order to operate within those 
standards.459 The scientific community’s norms surrounding proper uses of outer space 
(for scientific, peaceful, and not offensive-military purposes) became institutionalized 
through their codification into the UNCOPUOS and the Outer Space Treaty, which held 
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such a strong influence that even a hawkish government’s militarized space program 
was limited in its development so that it would still fall within these standards of peace. 
International Space Station 
The shift in focus of American and Russian space programs toward space 
stations in which scientific research could take place also came about due to the 
pervasiveness of this scientific norm. That outer space activity should have a peaceful, 
scientific purpose was a norm which the scientific community had continued to 
champion, bolstered by formal institutions (COPUOS, Outer Space Treaty, etc.), even 
during the SDI era and which had become more palatable for the American and Russian 
governments since the end of the Cold War and fall of the Soviet Union due to a 
decrease in perceived military threat. The Discovery link-up with Mir in 1994 and the 
hiring of Russian scientists for American space projects following the collapse of the 
USSR, even when those scientists were merely recreating work that NASA had 
American scientists already building, cemented this norm in the post-Soviet age, 
leading to the Intergovernmental Agreement on Space Station Cooperation and 
International Space Station.460 This agreement helped Russia maintain its status as an 
important player in the world, easing the sting of the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
These programs also benefitted U.S. security by providing an outlet for Soviet 
scientists to earn a living by producing technology that would benefit the world, rather 
than through programs that might further destabilize it. On the other hand, hiring 
Russian scientists to essentially recreate work that NASA was already having American 
scientists create was a waste of money in terms of gaining a material product. The U.S. 
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wanted to engage Russian scientists, keeping them from working in areas like weapons 
of mass destruction, but did not entirely trust them to make a product that fit U.S. 
technical specifications perfectly, which often differed significantly from Soviet 
standards.461 Thus on the one hand, it seems entirely self-interested and security-
focused to hire these scientists, decreasing the possible threat of them working for more 
nefarious countries, but on the other hand, spending money on a double-product seems 
a less-than-self-interested decision. And so, it is difficult to determine how much 
established norms of cooperation between the two scientific communities played a part 
in this decision as compared to self-interested security motives. But the fact that the 
U.S. came to the conclusion that it could and should hire Soviet scientists in their field 
of work (rather than any other method of dissuading them from working for a rogue-
country) shows that the norm of cooperation in the realm of outer space, which the 
scientific community had supported and which had been codified into international 
formal institutions, had become entrenched enough in the American government in 
order to allow consideration of this arrangement as a sound option.  
Doubling of work happened again with the Interim Control Module for the ISS, 
which was originally designed in the 1980s, but then redesigned in order to 
accommodate Russian technology in the late 1990s, and was itself already a redundant 
back-up, because its function was to be replaced by Russia’s Zvezda module 
regardless.462 Again, distrust over the reliability of the Russian space industry in a weak 
economy led to spending extra money on the doubling of work, but the fact that the 
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U.S. chose to allow Russia to design its own module for use with the ISS and then the 
U.S. redesigned its own original module (in case of Russian failure) to incorporate 
Russian technological requirements showed the commitment to cooperation that was an 
automatic, sub-conscious “given” within the Russian and American space programs by 
this point, due to the strength of the scientific epistemic community’s norms of 
cooperation and the strength of the formal institutions that codified these norms.  
Getting Russia on board with the ISS was important in establishing the nature of 
the U.S.-Russian relationship as collaborative rather than mirroring the tension of the 
U.S.-Soviet relationship. The optimism of incoming American and Russian presidents 
about the goal of getting U.S. and Russia to have a more positive relationship overall 
has helped to ensure the peaceful space relationship, which always remains as a symbol 
of the possibilities for U.S.-Russian relations, even when they become strained on the 
ground.463 This persistence is due in part to the treaties upholding this relationship, 
explained by neoliberal institutionalism, and the purpose of outer space activities, which 
tend to be peaceful due to the internalized norm of peaceful uses of outer space that has 
also been supported by institutions like the Outer Space Treaty, along with the 
continued coordination of the scientific communities across state borders, which 
epistemic community theory has shown to be important in the development and 
maintenance of the norm of cooperation and scientific uses of outer space over time.  
Language requirements are an interesting example of the uniqueness of the 
cooperative relationship between Russia and the U.S., as English and Russian, but not 
languages of other countries, are required for astronauts in cooperative programs. The 
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Shuttle-Mir program required knowledge of Russian and English by both sides, which 
makes sense given that these two countries were the only ones taking part.464 Even 
before the retiring of the shuttle program meant American travel to the ISS required the 
Russian Soyuz craft, “Runglish” was the language of choice, with crew members being 
required to speak both languages, even though other countries are involved in the ISS 
program.465 “Runglish” has been deemed the “unofficial” language of the ISS, with 
non-Russian and non-American astronauts being required to speak it.466 In fact, the term 
“Runglish” was actually coined in 2000 onboard the ISS.467 Often the language the 
addressee is most comfortable with (English for Americans and most Europeans, for 
example) will be the language of choice (rather than Italian for Italian astronauts).468 
Russian cosmonauts are required to have a good command of English before joining the 
space program and American astronauts are given extensive training to reach a “high 
intermediate” level of Russian in the U.S. before going to Russia for more language 
training.469 Russia’s place of importance alongside the U.S. has been clearly cemented 
in the norms and rules surrounding language use. Not only has it become a practical 
necessity, as Russian cosmonauts must function in the ISS’s official English language 
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and American astronauts must be able to interact with the Soyuz’s official Russian 
language, but it is also an indicator of status and importance in outer space.  
Although the U.S. had the technological prowess to blackball Russia from 
further involvement with space projects, it went out of the way to rewrite its ISS 
agreement in order to include Russia. It is interesting to note that although much of the 
cooperation between Russia and the U.S. has largely been bilateral throughout history, 
given the prominence of both states in outer space ventures, even as the ISS project 
began with many other states and not Russia, once Russia was included in the project, it 
immediately became an important enough player to merit bilateral agreements that have 
been regularly renewed and added onto between the U.S. and Russia.470 Furthermore, 
the U.S. made Russian a required language for the ISS and ISS-related astronaut 
training programs, even as English remains the official ISS language, symbolically 
placing Russia in a powerful position in the space realm. Russia’s status as an important 
player in space has only been given greater importance as the U.S. became entirely 
reliant on Russian RD-180 rockets and abandoned its own shuttle program.471 This 
decision, along with the one to hire Russian scientists in duplicating NASA projects 
upholds the formal institutions based upon the principles originally codified by the 
Outer Space Treaty and informal norms about the importance of scientific cooperation 
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in outer space. The choice to continue to uphold this cooperative system is not one that 
is consciously and rationally reevaluated every time a new administration comes to 
power or even every time the administrations realize that earthly cooperation will not be 
as easy as they had hoped. Instead, the cooperative system, characterized today by 
Russia’s financial dependency and America’s transportation and rocket technology 
dependency, is the default which governments in the present automatically adhere to out 
of habit.472 The juxtaposition between the purely scientific, unofficial communications 
about the possibility of cooperation during the 1960s and the high level of technological 
and financial interdependency that even includes the private sector in the modern day 
shows the power of norms shaped by an epistemic community in impacting habit 
formation and entrenching the system in cooperation.473  
Concluding Thoughts 
The framework of neoliberal institutionalism and epistemic community-focused 
constructivism helps to explain why the U.S. and Russia have decided to cooperate in 
the past and have maintained space cooperation in the midst of sanctions, territorial 
disputes, and other conflicts. Certain periods of cooperation have begun and ended 
quickly, much like a neorealist might expect, fluctuating along with the general 
relationship at the time, like with the Apollo-Soyuz mission that lined up with détente. 
But other periods of cooperation have outlasted periods of warmth (or at least thaw), 
and would seem to be based on irrational state action judging on self-interest, as with 
the U.S.’s retiring of the shuttle program in favor of complete reliance on the Russian 
Soyuz for access to the ISS. Neorealism’s focus on self-interest (and coercion as a 
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subset of that motive, as coercion involves a threat that self-interest bars a state from 
wanting to allow) is useful then in part for understanding the motives for space 
cooperation (emergence and maintenance), but lacks the additional pieces of the puzzle 
– norms, epistemic communities, and institutions – that have played a part in the 
cooperation between the U.S. and Russia in outer space. Neoliberal institutionalists, on 
the other hand, specifically discuss the sorts of institutions, like treaties and 
organizations, which have been an integral part of the cooperation between the U.S. and 
Russia. Neoliberal institutionalism accounts for the institutions that have been created in 
the emergence and especially maintenance of cooperation. Epistemic community theory 
helps to fill in the gaps in neoliberal institutionalism with regard to emergence by 
helping to explain why norms about outer space practices became formally 
institutionalized and emerged in the first place. Given the important role the scientific 
community played in creating the cooperative environment and setting the tone as a 
cooperative scientific one that led to the Apollo-Soyuz mission, it is necessary to 
remember that when government leaders make decisions using a cost-benefit analysis, 
they do so within a frame of mind that includes values and beliefs about proper uses of 
outer space and respect for formal institutions. The norms of outer space use were 
rooted in beliefs about the nature of scientific advancements that the scientific 
community supported in pushing the government to assimilate these ideas and the 
formal institutions played a crucial role in upholding these norms even as relations 
became more strained. 
A key question to examine is what determines which pattern – sustained 
cooperation or fleeting cooperation punctuated by competition – holds in each case. The 
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clearest example of sustained cooperation is the low-level collaboration and dialogue 
that began at least as early as the International Geophysical Year and has continued, 
without significant interruption, to the present day. Even through fluctuations in U.S.-
Soviet/Russian relations, through the space race, détente, SDI, the Soviet collapse, and 
recent disagreements and conflict over earthly events like Chechen conflicts, Ukrainian 
conflicts and Russian annexation of Crimea, and the Syrian war, which have had 
negative consequences like arms races, sanctions, and removal from international 
institutions (like removal of Russia from the G8), the scientific community, including 
and especially those working for the official Russian branches of government (either 
military during the USSR or the Russian space industry more recently) and NASA, have 
continued to meet through various private and public formal institutions like the 
Committee on Space Research, UNCOPUOS, the International Astronautical 
Federation, and the Planetary Society to discuss cooperative ventures.474 In this case, 
cooperation has held throughout, regardless of the general population’s thoughts toward 
the other country and the government’s official stances regarding the other, due to the 
strength of norms in the epistemic community.475  
Following the space race, scientists also engaged in cooperative projects and 
have done so ever since, even in times when the U.S.-Russian relationship was rather 
negative, like during the early 1980s.476 The scientific community engaged with leaders 
in the government early on in order to boost the institutionalization of cooperative, 
peaceful, scientific norms surrounding the proper uses of outer space.477 The 
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codification of these norms led to the socialization of the governments over time into 
the mindset of viewing space cooperation as a given, from which they would deviate 
only after consciously deciding upon a need to do so, as with SDI; however even in 
those cases, they still tempered their deviances from the institutionalized framework in 
order to not entirely ignore those standards. This shows the importance of the scientific 
community in shaping government beliefs and in turn policies over time as the norms 
this epistemic community championed became more engrained in the states’ identities 
through the process of socialization.  
But what of the cooperation events that were fleeting? Why did the socialization 
process of norm-transfer not prove effective in these cases? A large part of this answer 
is simply not enough time elapsed and the newness of the institutionalized norm of 
space cooperation. In the Apollo-Soyuz mission, often touted by both governments as 
the golden-child of cooperation and certainly one of the most publicized cooperative 
ventures between the U.S. and Russia/the Soviet Union, it seems that the general belief 
in détente and the ending of the space race, which decreased fears about status, fostered 
an environment in which government officials felt secure enough to entertain the idea of 
using the framework used by the epistemic community of scientists on a large-scale. 
Institutionalists like Eyre and Suchman and constructivists like Johnston point to the 
importance of status in determining state action.478 But once the collaborative project 
ended, so too did large-scale cooperation for many years. This tells us that the 
governments had not been completely socialized into the attitudes and beliefs of the 
scientific community at this period. Socialization requires an actor to be steeped in the 
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beliefs, norms, and values of a group and to internalize these itself.479 Identities tend not 
to be quickly changed, as actors unconsciously hold onto many of their values and 
norms and simply act on these aspects of their identity out of habit.480 Changing an 
actor’s identity takes time. It is likely that the space race had left its mark in both 
governments, so that although they now felt less need to dominate each other through a 
status game, both still held onto their differing identities, which included a starkly 
contrasting ideology and different beliefs about how best to organize outer space 
operations in their own country (with NASA being a civilian branch, and the Soviet 
space program being overseen by the military). 
This situation starkly contrasts with the current high level of cooperation and 
even dependency between the U.S. and Russia, which has come about through 
institutions, path dependencies, epistemic community beliefs, socialization, and habit 
formation. The current strength of cooperation shows that cooperation has become more 
institutionalized over time. Epistemic community theory shows how the scientific 
community spread its norms into both governments using formal institutional 
codification through UN agreements as well as through informal interactions with 
government leaders in which they touted the benefits of a cooperative framework.481 
Over time, the path dependency has grown for the institutions upholding outer space 
activities as peaceful, cooperative ventures and governments have grown more in the 
habit of allowing cooperation, to the point where the norm of space cooperation has 
become so entrenched that the governments have decided to become entirely 
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cooperative and dependent on one another in the ISS project.482 This shows the 
importance of having continued efforts of socialization over time in affecting the 
recipient of the socialization effort.483 The difference in strength of cooperation between 
the Apollo-Soyuz era (weak) and the present day (strong) not only shows the 
effectiveness of epistemic communities and institutions in shaping and strengthening 
norms, but also suggests that these processes take a rather long time to become 
entrenched. As such, it is not out of place to assume that as long as the scientific 
community continues to uphold these norms (which is likely) and the strength of the 
institutions upholding these norms continues (which is also likely), U.S.-Russian space 
cooperation will also continue. The following chapter will explore what these findings 
mean for the future of U.S.-Russian space cooperation as well as the future of space 
cooperation in general.  
 Chapter 5: Conclusion 
This thesis has sought to explain why space cooperation between the Soviet 
Union/Russia and the United States emerged in history and why it has continued into 
the present, even amidst otherwise tense U.S.-Russian relations. Chapters two and three 
provided historical background regarding U.S. and Russian activities in space and 
theories of international relations, respectively. The fourth chapter combined these tools 
in order to analyze reasons for space cooperation’s emergence and maintenance. This 
chapter concludes the thesis by examining the findings of the analysis in answering the 
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research question and exploring the significance of these conclusions for the present and 
future of space cooperation.  
Outer space cooperation has been an interesting success story. This analysis has 
shown the reasons for the successful emergence of space cooperation – namely, the role 
of a determined epistemic community in supporting the norm of outer space as a 
cooperative, peaceful, scientific environment through informal cooperation and the 
creation of formal institutions in setting this standard. Maintenance of lower-level space 
cooperation has been largely consistent in some form since its emergence, due to the 
norms of collaboration supported by the scientific community and formal institutions 
supporting these actions. On the other hand, maintenance of large-scale space 
cooperation has not been consistent since its emergence, with certain periods of large-
scale, publicized cooperation ending quickly after the project’s completion (e.g. the 
Apollo-Soyuz Mission) and other periods of large-scale, publicized cooperation 
continuing (e.g. the ISS, U.S. reliance on Russian rockets and the Russian Soyuz). This 
difference is accounted for in the different levels of entrenchment of the space 
cooperation norm in the upper-government level in a given time period, due to process 
of socialization, habit-formation, geopolitical interests, and considerations of status. 
This explains the contemporary environment of strong space cooperation, which has 
remained constant in spite of the periodic ups and downs in U.S.-Russian relations. 
These findings are significant not only for the future of U.S.-Russian space cooperation, 
but also for the future of space cooperation with other countries, and the increasing 
involvement of the private sector into outer space activities, which will be discussed in 
greater detail below.  
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The significance of this finding applies to future space cooperation with Russia. 
Based on these findings, it is likely that space cooperation with Russia will continue 
unless a large-scale interruption occurs (e.g. the UN loses legitimacy, thus weakening 
the Outer Space Treaty; scientists are restricted from communicating; etc.). This does 
not imply there are not still some tensions in the space relationship; U.S. Congressmen 
have voiced concerns about reliance on Russian RD-180 rockets, particularly as 
Russian-American relations have soured over Ukraine and Syria, with support for an 
alternative, American solution coming from SpaceX (and those members of Congress to 
whom they contribute).484 On the other hand, in a 2015 hearing in the House of 
Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, 
former NASA Administrator Michael Griffin explained that the reliance has become so 
entrenched in NASA that the Atlas 5 launch system operated jointly by Lockheed 
Martin and Boeing, which carries various types of satellites, orbiters, and other space 
vehicles into orbit, is entirely dependent on the Russian RD-180 rockets and would have 
to be retired completely were the use of RD-180 to be discontinued.485 Scientists and 
policymakers have lamented that this “solution” (the ending of reliance in order to make 
a statement about disapproval over other areas of U.S.-Russian relations) would leave 
the U.S. unable to meet its own legal requirement for two independent systems of 
national security space launch capability.486  
Clearly, the decades long entrenchment of the norm of cooperation and scientific 
activity in outer space has led to a pragmatic difficulty for those who seek to end it. In 
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all likelihood, even if Russian-American relations continue to deteriorate, scientists will 
continue to argue in favor of cooperation, if not explicitly for the greater norm of 
cooperation and scientific projects in space, then for, as former NASA Administrator 
Michael D. Griffin says, the “decades of government investment” in systems based in 
cooperation with Russia; it would, Griffin argues, “require a decade or more to realize 
[an American replacement], and [this] neither can nor should be done in haste.”487 
Scientists in the U.S. and Russia continue to work together, with the ISS as a main point 
of cooperation, which will, due the socialization of the U.S. and Russia into acceptance 
of norms supporting space cooperation, that have fundamentally altered the space 
systems of both countries to require this cooperation, likely continue to operate and 
serve as a symbol of the extraordinary results of international cooperation.  
There is a small possibility that large-scale cooperation could be interrupted, 
given the right geopolitical conditions (e.g. a status-based power match reigniting 
between the two governments, with strong leaders), if the ISS were to require retirement 
and the question of a new ISS to come about during this sort of political environment, 
which might subject it to delayed or decreased funding. Norms are not stagnant; this is 
what allowed the norm of space cooperation to take hold initially, and it also suggests 
the possibility that the norm of space cooperation could be smothered in the upper-
government level over time. This possibility seems less likely than the ending of large-
scale cooperation following the Apollo-Soyuz mission, however, because even as 
tensions have heightened to a level that some have called “proxy wars,” these norms 
have continued to hold, an observation that drew me to this research question in the first 
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place.488 Institutional power in upholding norms of cooperation will also help to prevent 
the ending of large-scale cooperation between Russia and the U.S. The low-level 
cooperation between scientists will almost certainly continue to exist regardless of the 
political environment, due to the strength of the epistemic community in upholding 
these norms of scientific cooperation in space and the institutional power in protecting 
these norms.  
The effectiveness of the entrenchment of norms of scientific ventures and 
cooperation in space to the point of creating a system that requires cooperation to 
function also has implications for other countries, and emerging space powers in 
particular. While Russia and the U.S. were working bilaterally as early as the 1950s on 
a low level, “middle-range” space powers (France, Japan, China, Britain, and India) 
were a decade behind in basic satellite production, with the “new entrants” (Israel, 
Brazil, North Korea, Iran, and South Korea) attempting and only sometimes achieving 
this in the very recent past.489 Although the European Space Agency, Canada, and Japan 
are involved in the International Space Station, their number of space launches has 
paled in comparison to the U.S. and Russia; this is less surprising when remembering 
that these states lacked the Cold War strategic need that drove the American and Soviet 
military space programs.490 The U.S. and Russia have already begun working with 
emerging space powers, as with the International Space Station. Instances of 
cooperation between non-rivalrous emerging space powers and the U.S. are less 
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difficult than the emergence of cooperation between the rivalrous U.S. and Soviet 
Union, because geopolitical interests and status competitions have not blocked the 
scientific community in these countries from upholding their norm of cooperation. 
Thus, it is likely that cooperation can and will continue to flourish between emerging, 
non-rivalrous space powers. 
Does U.S.-Russian space cooperation’s perseverance in spite of negative 
relations mean that there is room for the U.S. to cooperate with other rivalrous emerging 
space powers? Here, the answer is less clear. Interestingly, although the U.S. spends 
almost three times more than the rest of the world’s space spending combined, followed 
by Europe in a very distant second place, China and Russia tie in third place, each 
spending about half as much as the European Space Agency.491 This suggests that 
China is an important power in space, and its ratification of the Outer Space Treaty and 
involvement in the UNCOPUOS since 1980 seem promising, but the possibility of 
cooperation seems less likely than with the U.S. and Russia.  
First, for the U.S. and China, this is in part because of the time Russian-U.S. 
space cooperation has taken to emerge; both sides of a bilateral relationship have to 
come to agreements in order to move forward with a partnership, and while norms of 
using outer space for scientific, cooperative purposes have become entrenched in the 
American and Russian systems, this cooperative orientation cannot be shifted to a U.S.-
China system overnight, just as it could not be suddenly changed to a purely American 
or Russian system, as discussed earlier.  
                                                 
491 Ibid., 545.  
113 
Second, it seems as though the norms of space cooperation and peaceful uses of 
outer space are not necessarily present in the Chinese space program, evidenced by its 
2007 launch of an anti-satellite weapon, which many viewed as an offensive posturing, 
asserting its dominance, as well as having the unfortunate side-effect of creating a huge 
amount of dangerous space debris, which jeopardizes the space assets of all 
countries.492  
Third, the U.S. Congress has passed legislation that bans NASA scientists from 
working with or using funds for any Chinese officials, organizations, and scientific 
experts, although there has been confusion about to what extent this ban operates.493 As 
a major factor in creating the strong and lasting space cooperation between the U.S. and 
Russia was the consistent dialogue and cooperation between scientists from both 
countries, this limitation suggests the power of an epistemic community in leading to 
U.S.-Chinese cooperation is miniscule. Likewise, this ban means a block of space-
related bilateral agreements between the U.S. and China, which weakens the possibility 
of cooperation, as they lack a basic framework for cooperation.494 It also eliminates the 
opportunity for scientific cooperation to socialize China into acceptance of peaceful 
norms regarding outer space activities. China is not currently even allowed onboard the 
ISS, although other, less active players like South Africa, Brazil, and Malaysia, are 
                                                 
492 U.S Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, China’s Space Program: Options for U.S.-
China Cooperation, by Jeffrey Logan, RS22777 (2008): 1.; Ranger, Interview. 
493 Ian Sample, “US scientists boycott Nasa conference over China ban,” The Guardian, October 4, 2013, 
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2013/oct/05/us-scientists-boycott-nasa-china-ban.; U.S. 
Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Unconstitutional Restrictions on Activities of the Office 
of Science and Technology Policy in Section 1340(A) of the Department of Defense and Full-Year 
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, by Virginia A. Seitz, Vol. 35 (2011). 
494 Leonard David, “US-China Cooperation in Space: Is It Possible, and What’s in Store?” Space.com, 
June 16, 2015, http://www.space.com/29671-china-nasa-space-station-cooperation.html. 
114 
allowed.495 The U.S.-China relationship lacks the tools that create and maintain lasting 
space cooperation.  
Other rivalrous emerging space powers will likely face similar difficulties in 
establishing cooperation, especially given that the scientific community seems to have 
less freedom to establish connections with high-risk scientific communities than they 
did in the 1950s and 1960s. This additional freedom was an important part of the 
emergence of the U.S.-Russian space relationship, and contemporary government 
crackdowns on establishing scientific connections with rivalrous states, as with the 
American ban of Chinese scientist cooperation, hinder the emergence of cooperation 
with other rivalrous emerging space powers. 
The Chinese-Russian relationship, although warmer to the idea of cooperating, 
faces a more materialistic challenge, which is the level of entanglement between the 
U.S. and Russian space programs (meaning it would be more difficult for Russia to 
compromise on technology like it did in the Apollo-Soyuz program) and budget 
restrictions, as the U.S. is by far the leader in the market.496 If cooperation were to 
occur, it would likely be on a very basic level in which China buys RD-180 rockets 
from Russia, and it is not unlikely that this might occur, as high-level leaders have 
already met to discuss this possibility.497 Cooperation with less contentious countries on 
a more multilateral level is already occurring through the ISS and will likely continue to 
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do so, given the power of the scientific community through formal institutions which 
uphold their norms of scientific, cooperative uses of outer space. 
 Questions of activity by the private sector in outer space are not new, but as they 
become more possible, the issue of how this industry fits in with U.S.-Russian space 
cooperation is increasingly important. In 1985, long before Virgin Galactic came about, 
Dula argued for the need to determine how private sector activities fit into a state-based 
system of formal institutions regulating outer space activity and argued in favor of a 
legal code that minimized regulations and recognized capitalist freedom in space.498 
Since then, the United States has emphasized the increasing role private sector will play 
in outer space exploration, although today private industry still is largely recognized in 
terms of the umbrella of a particular state.499 In fact, the private sector for space in the 
U.S is almost entirely based on U.S. government demand and streamlined through three 
main companies on the supply side, which chips away at an image of a private space 
sector that thrives on competition, when in reality it is far more oligopolistic.500 On the 
Russian side, Roscosmos, Russia’s current space agency and NASA’s functional 
counterpart, is actually a corporation, albeit a state-owned one; this degree of separation 
began as an institutional reform in 1992 separating civilian and military activities and 
later a change to a state-owned corporation, giving it an even more civilian nature, like 
NASA.501 It is difficult to imagine that the private sector space industry, which is so 
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heavily tied to a government customer, would pose a large threat to U.S.-Russian space 
cooperation in the near future. The private sector will continue to become more 
important in space exploration, and it seems to be the most pioneering in its research.502  
One area in which the private sector’s increased strength might chip away at a 
cooperative program is in the Russian Soyuz craft, on which the U.S. currently relies in 
order to get to the ISS due to the retiring of its shuttle program, and for which SpaceX 
and Boeing are currently competing to create an alternative.503 But space tourism, 
exploration, and even providing an alternative transport module for the U.S. by the 
private sector seems unlikely to interfere with a norm of scientific collaboration in 
space between the U.S. and Russia, which can continue through joint scientific 
experiments and can even integrate the private sector as it has begun to do, and with the 
formal institutions which uphold the cooperative partnership. 
 The U.S. and Russian space programs today are a stark contrast to the 1950s and 
1960s. Over the years, they have been involved in low-level cooperation due to the 
efforts of their scientists in establishing within the system norms of peaceful, scientific, 
and cooperative activities in outer space. Although at times their large-scale cooperation 
has seemed to ebb and flow with the general tide of U.S.-Russian relations, since the 
end of the Cold War there has been a steady increase and continuation of cooperation in 
outer space, amidst negative periods in U.S.-Russian relations. The deeply entrenched 
nature of the scientific community’s norms of outer space and the formal institutions 
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upholding these standards suggests that cooperation is likely to continue between the 
U.S. and Russia and this cooperation will continue to be unique from and more 
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